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Article 
Globalization Without a Safety Net: The 
Challenge of Protecting Cross-Border 
Funding of NGOs 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In 2017, Compassion International announced that it would 
be closing its operations in India after forty-eight years and end-
ing its services to 145,000 Indian children.1 The reason for this 
drastic action was that the Indian government was adding Com-
passion to the over 11,000 nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) that, since 2014, had lost their required licenses to ac-
cept foreign funds.2 Similarly, in 2015, the MacArthur Founda-
tion announced it was closing its Moscow office after having 
made more than $173 million in grants over nearly twenty-five 
years to promote higher education and human rights and to limit 
proliferation of weapons in Russia.3 The Foundation did not 
want to end its activities in Russia, but it stated that a series of 
laws enacted by Russian lawmakers that targeted foreign-
funded NGOs, culminating in those lawmakers recommending 
that the Foundation be formally designated as “undesirable,” 
 
†  Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts from participants in the International Society of 
Third Sector Research 12th International Conference, the Nonprofit Forum, 
and the Notre Dame Faculty Colloquium, and from Andrea Bjorklund, Jimmy 
Gurulé, and Mark Sidel. I am also very grateful for research assistance from 
Erik Adams, Jennifer Bandeen, and Dehmeh Smith. Copyright © 2018 by Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer. 
 1. Ellen Barry & Suhasini Raj, Major Christian Charity Forced To Halt 
Work in India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2017, at A4. 
 2. Id.; see also Noreen Ohlrich, Nonprofits Shut Down as India Cuts Off 
Funding, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/01/ 
30/nonprofits-shut-india-cuts-off-funding. 
 3. Henry Meyer, MacArthur Foundation Leaves Russia amid NGO “Witch 
Hunt,” BLOOMBERG, (2015); see also The MacArthur Foundation in Russia: 
1991–2015, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/tags/russia (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
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had forced its hand.4 These stories would be troubling enough in 
isolation, but they have been repeated not only in India and Rus-
sia but also in China, Hungary, Kenya, and many other coun-
tries.5 Indeed, recent studies indicate that more than fifty coun-
tries are placing increasing restrictions on (1) domestic NGOs 
that receive funding from outside their countries’ borders; and 
(2) foreign NGOs that provide such funding, sharply restricting 
the ability of both types of entities to pursue their legitimate 
charitable endeavors.6 
Cross-border funding is a critical resource for NGOs in many 
countries for a variety of reasons, including limited domestic re-
sources and the lack of a domestic philanthropic culture.7 At the 
same time, such funding is often viewed with suspicion by the 
governments of these countries (“host countries”) because they 
are concerned about potential challenges to government author-
ity, foreign influence, and possible cultural conflicts.8 While such 
concerns are generally not sufficient to justify limiting or regu-
lating such support under international law, they provide moti-
vations for governments to do so while publicly relying on other, 
more defensible justifications, such as national security and ac-
countability. Cross-border funders seeking to challenge such le-
gal restrictions under international law face great difficulty do-
ing so in most countries, however, because of the limited reach 
 
 4. Press Release, MacArthur Found., Statement of MacArthur President 
Julia Stasch on the Foundation’s Russian Office (July 21, 2015), https:// 
www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/statement-macarthur-president-julia 
-stasch-foundations-russia-office; Meyer, supra note 3. 
 5. See, e.g., Helene Bienvenu & Palko Karasz, In Anti-Soros Feud, Hun-
gary Adopts Rules on Foreign-Financed Groups, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2017, at 
A4; Jennifer Brass, Kenya’s Clampdown on Civil Society Is Against Its Self-In-
terest, CONVERSATION (July 11, 2016), http://theconversation.com/kenyas 
-clampdown-on-civil-society-is-against-its-self-interest-62019; Josh Chin, New 
Chinese Law Puts Foreign Nonprofits in Limbo; Many NGOs Could be Made 
Illegal on Jan. 1 amid Campaign Against Unwanted Foreign Influences, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-nonprofits-brace-for 
-new-regulations-in-china-1481735054. 
 6. See infra note 24. 
 7. This appears to be particularly true for advocacy NGOs that are often 
in conflict with host-country governmental authorities. See, e.g., Thomas Parks, 
The Rise and Fall of Donor Funding for Advocacy NGOs: Understanding the 
Impact, 18 DEV. PRAC. 213, 219 (Apr. 2008) (discussing developing countries in 
Asia); Kenneth Roth, The Great Civil Society Choke-Out, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 
27, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/the-great-civil-society 
-choke-out-human-rights-democracy-india-russia-china-kenya. 
 8. Parks, supra note 7, at 218. 
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of the applicable international human rights treaties and inade-
quate enforcement regimes under the most directly applicable 
international agreements.9 
One potentially promising avenue for closing this gap be-
tween international law and actual practice are the investment 
treaties to which many host countries and the home countries of 
cross-border funders are party.10 This growing web of treaties 
often define both investor and investment broadly enough to 
reach at least some cross-border funding of NGOs, and also gen-
erally provide a relatively effective enforcement mechanism for 
resolving disputes between investors and host countries.11 But a 
closer examination of both the jurisdictional and other hurdles 
for invoking these treaties and the costs of trying to overcome 
those hurdles reveals significant barriers for cross-border fun-
ders. These barriers are difficult for NGOs to overcome because 
of their limited financial resources and the likely modest amount 
of any possible damages they could recover, particularly in light 
of recent data about the substantial financial costs incurred by 
for-profit investors that seek investment treaty protection. As a 
result, the promise of these treaties to protect cross-border fund-
ing of NGOs is unlikely to be fulfilled, unless ways are found to 
cover or significantly reduce those costs. Furthermore, most af-
fected NGOs presumably are not interested primarily in recov-
ering monetary damages but are instead primarily interested in 
being free to pursue their activities in the host countries, a goal 
not well-suited to the usual investment treaty dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Absent ways to resolve these shortcomings, another alterna-
tive is to consider what lessons the successful development of the 
 
 9. A possible exception is the pending court challenge under the European 
Convention on Human Rights to some of Russia’s actions in this regard. See 
infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Timothy C. Evered, Foreign Investment Issues for International 
Non-Governmental Organizations: International Health Projects in China and 
the Former Soviet Union, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 153, 171–78 (1996); Nick Gallus & 
Luke Eric Peterson, International Investment Treaty Protection of NGOs, 22 
ARB. INT’L 527, 532–34 (2006); Sabine Konrad, Protection for Non-Profit Organ-
izations, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 555, 557–58 (Marc Bungenberg 
et al. eds., 2015); see also Gregory W. MacKenzie, Note, ICSID Arbitration as a 
Strategy for Levelling the Playing Field Between International Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations and Host States, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 197, 223–33 
(1993) (suggesting using international arbitration, which is increasingly used 
to resolve trade and cross-border investment disputes, to protect cross-border 
funding of NGOs). 
 11. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 215–16. 
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investment treaty regime provides regarding the conditions that 
would be needed for the development of a separate treaty frame-
work to more robustly protect cross-border funding of NGOs. Un-
fortunately, it appears that such conditions do not exist cur-
rently and may not exist for many years. In their absence and 
the absence of any other viable international law solution in the 
foreseeable future, the remaining alternative for NGOs is to con-
tinue pursuing ad hoc, country-specific efforts to resist the in-
creasing legal restrictions on such funding. 
This Article begins by summarizing the growth of burden-
some legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs. It then 
analyzes in Part II the promise of investment treaties to counter 
such restrictions, including the jurisdictional and other signifi-
cant legal hurdles to including such funding within the reach of 
those treaties that may undermine that promise. Part III then 
explores the financial and possible other costs of invoking invest-
ment treaty protections and explains why those substantial costs 
further undermine that promise. Part IV considers two options 
for salvaging the promise of international treaties to address 
these restrictions. One option would be to reduce the financial 
costs to NGOs of invoking existing investment treaties either 
through third-party financing or by encouraging pro bono assis-
tance, with the hope that it would then be feasible for many af-
fected NGOs to obtain favorable arbitration decisions with re-
spect to the jurisdictional and other legal hurdles. The other 
option is to learn what factors are needed to develop momentum 
for new treaties that could protect cross-border funding of NGOs 
from the history of investment treaties, and to examine whether 
those factors currently exist or could be developed in the foresee-
able future. Unfortunately, the prospects for these options are 
not bright, and therefore Part V discusses a menu of ad hoc, 
country-specific methods for resisting restrictions on such fund-
ing that have proven successful in some instances. 
I.  THE “CLOSING SPACE” FOR NGOS   
A. THRESHOLD ISSUES 
One threshold issue when considering cross-border funding 
of NGOs is how to define nongovernmental organization, espe-
cially for purposes of international law.12 Domestic legal defini-
tions vary, but scholars who have considered the issue typically 
 
 12. See Gregor Zymek, Too Invested in Politics? - Advocacy and State Fund-
ing as Limits of NGO Claimants in Investor-State Arbitration 10–12 (Aug. 15, 
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define nongovernmental organization or related terms such as 
nonprofit by the characteristics that tend to be shared across 
countries and serve to distinguish such entities from businesses, 
governments, and families, including not distributing profits to 
owners and voluntary participation.13 For purposes of this Arti-
cle, it is sufficient to identify NGOs as legal entities under the 
applicable domestic law that (1) do not have profit-seeking as 
their primary motivation (as distinct from businesses); (2) are 
not governmental entities (although they may receive significant 
government funding); and (3) for which involvement by individ-
uals is generally voluntary.14 
Another threshold issue is the significance of cross-border 
funding of NGOs, in terms of both its amount and impact. Turn-
ing first to amount, it is difficult to do more than roughly esti-
mate the extent of cross-border funding of NGOs annually, be-
cause there are no official compilations of such funding. Overall 
development aid (defined broadly) from both governmental and 
private sources appears to be slightly more than $200 billion an-
nually.15 Of this amount, incomplete data based on information 
from thirty-nine countries indicates that private giving (includ-
ing from individuals and businesses, as well as NGOs, and to 
governments as well as to host country NGOs) was slightly more 
 
2016) (unpublished LL.M. research project, McGill University) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing the lack of legal definition under international law). 
 13. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, DEFINING THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 33–34 (1997) (identifying 
five common characteristics of nonprofits: organized, private, non-profit-distrib-
uting, self-governing, and voluntary); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” 
Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
51, 55–56 (2012) (describing common characteristics of nonprofits); Lester M. 
Salamon & S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Beyond Nonprofits: Re-conceptualizing the 
Third Sector, 27 VOLUNTAS 1515, 1517–18 (2016) (describing common charac-
teristics of nonprofits); Michael Bernhard et al., The Varieties of Democracy Core 
Civil Society Index 7–8 (The Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper Series 
2015:13, 2015), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/47/2e/472eec11-830f 
-4578-9a09-d9f8d43cee3a/v-dem_working_paper_2015_13_edited.pdf (identify-
ing civil society organizations as “groups of self-organized interested citizens” 
acting in pursuit of those citizens’ interests broadly conceived and distinct from 
groups engaged in purely spiritual or economic activity). 
 14. This broad definition avoids the potential trap of limiting NGOs only to 
organizations that promote certain (generally Global North) values. See Thomas 
Kelley, Wait! That’s Not What We Meant by Civil Society!: Questioning the NGO 
Orthodoxy in West Africa, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 993, 1000–02 (2011). 
 15. HUDSON INST., THE INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND REMIT-
TANCES 2016, at 6 (2016); Anup Shah, Foreign Aid for Development Assistance, 
GLOBAL ISSUES (last updated Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.globalissues.org/ 
article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance#Sidenoteonprivatecontributions. 
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than $60 billion in 2014.16 Of course not all cross-border funding 
of NGOs necessarily falls within the term development aid, even 
defined broadly, so these are very rough figures. They neverthe-
less indicate that such funding totals annually at least tens of 
billions of dollars and possibly significantly more. 
The impact of such funding is even more difficult to deter-
mine. Most commentators assume that such funding has positive 
effects on the recipient NGOs and the populations of their host 
countries, both with respect to meeting basic human needs and 
with respect to promoting human rights and democracy.17 But 
while there are numerous studies that focus on the impact of 
NGOs in a specific area (education, health care) or in a specific 
country, more comprehensive evaluations are generally lacking. 
Some funders, particularly larger ones, commission evaluations 
of their own efforts, but outsiders often criticize such evaluations 
as biased and incomplete.18 The area where it appears there 
have been the most robust attempts to measure the overall im-
pact of efforts that often receive cross-border funding is with re-
spect to specific methods of international development, but even 
in this context such comprehensive studies are still very much 
in their infancy and face significant obstacles.19 As a result, some 
commentators question the extent to which such funding has 
positive effects on the recipient domestic NGOs, and through 
them their host countries.20 The strength of any positive effects 
 
 16. HUDSON INST., supra note 15, at 6. 
 17. For a thoughtful consideration of this assumption with respect to pro-
moting democracy, see generally FUNDING VIRTUE: CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DE-
MOCRACY PROMOTION (Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers eds., 2000). 
 18. Compare, e.g., Robert Klara, Infographic: A Look at the Millions of Lives 
Saved and Improved by the Gates Foundation, ADWEEK (June 1, 2016), http:// 
www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/infographic-look-millions-lives-saved-and 
-improved-gates-foundation-171643 (depicting the foundation’s positive contri-
bution to global health and development), with, e.g., Julia Belluz, The Media 
Loves the Gates Foundation. These Experts Are More Skeptical, VOX 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/6/10/8760199/gates-foundation 
-criticism (challenging the foundation’s “lack of transparency, its veto power 
over other global health institutions, and its spending priorities”). 
 19. See Henrik Hansen & Neda Trifković, Means to an End: The Importance 
of the Research Question for Systematic Reviews in International Development, 
27 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 707, 717–20 (2015); Richard Mallett et al., The Benefits 
and Challenges of Using Systematic Reviews in International Development Re-
search, 4 J. DEV. EFFECTIVENESS 445, 453 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., Nicola Banks et al., NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still 
Too Close for Comfort?, 66 WORLD DEV. 707, 710–13 (2014); Peter Nunnenkamp 
& Hannes Öhler, Funding, Competition and the Efficiency of NGOs: An Empir-
ical Analysis of Non-charitable Expenditure of US NGOs Engaged in Foreign 
Aid, 65 KYKLOS 81, 81–82 (2012); Michael Hobbes, Stop Trying To Save the 
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may also be dependent on conditions beyond the control of 
NGOs, such as the extent of other freedoms in a given country.21 
And of course trying to separate the flows of funding of particular 
interest in this Article—from foreign NGOs to domestic NGOs—
is also difficult. 
Even given these limitations, and while undoubtedly some 
of the funding has little positive impact or may even have a neg-
ative impact on the recipient NGOs and their host countries, 
even critical observers tend to conclude that a substantial 
amount of cross-border funding for NGOs is positively affecting 
education, health, and other metrics that the funders, the recip-
ients, and host-country governments generally agree are desira-
ble.22 In addition and as detailed below, permitting such funding 
is an aspect of the generally recognized right to freedom of asso-
ciation.23 Unnecessary restrictions on such funding are therefore 
likely both to have a negative impact on host country populations 
in the aggregate and to violate recognized international human 
rights; if the restrictions are severe enough to sharply curtail or 
even end such funding, both that impact and that violation will 
almost certainly be significant. 
B. INCREASING LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER 
FUNDING OF NGOS 
Numerous articles, reports, and studies have documented 
the increasing use over the past decade of legal restrictions to 
create significant administrative and reputational burdens for 
domestic NGOs that receive cross-border funding and for the for-
eign NGOs that provide such funding. More specifically, Maina 
 
World: Big Ideas Are Destroying International Development, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120178/problem-international 
-development-and-plan-fix-it. 
 21. See, e.g., Nuno S. Themudo, Reassessing the Impact of Civil Society: 
Nonprofit Sector, Press Freedom, and Corruption, 26 GOVERNANCE 63, 66–70 
(2013); Anna Lührmann et al., Constraining Governments: New Indices of Ver-
tical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability 19, 25, 28 (Varieties of Democracy 
Inst., Working Paper Series 2017:46, 2017), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_ 
public/9f/ff/9fffb5f8-9399-4e3d-ba60-f8341c177343/v-dem_working_paper_2017 
_46.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., Banks et al., supra note 20, at 712–13; see also Michael Bern-
hard et al., Institutional Subsystems and the Survival of Democracy: Do Political 
and Civil Society Matter? 24 (Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper Se-
ries 2015:4, 2015), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b2/08/b208c64e 
-53e1-4203-bb34-5f3adc8674c0/v-dem_working_paper_2015_4.pdf (explaining 
empirical work indicating the positive effect of civil society on the survival of 
democratic forms of governance). 
 23. Infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
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Kiai, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association from 2011 to 
2017; Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace; and David Moore and Douglas Rutzen of the In-
ternational Center for Not-for-Profit Law, among others, have 
documented this development.24 The issue has become high pro-
file enough to attract not only significant media coverage but 
also the attention of the U.S. Congress and a prominent Wash-
ington, D.C. think tank.25 
Russia is often cited as one of the first countries to take this 
approach, with its enactment of burdensome registration re-
quirements and expanded government supervisory powers for 
noncommercial organizations in 2006 in the wake of the color 
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.26 It then enhanced these re-
quirements in 2012 with a law requiring Russian organizations 
to register as foreign agents if they receive foreign assistance 
and intend to attempt to change government policy.27 On its face, 
 
 24. Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association), Report on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful As-
sembly and of Association, ¶¶ 8–42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (Apr. 24, 2013); 
THOMAS CAROTHERS, THE CLOSING SPACE CHALLENGE: HOW ARE FUNDERS RE-
SPONDING? 4–8 (2015); THOMAS CAROTHERS & SASKIA BRECHENMACHER, CLOS-
ING SPACE: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORT UNDER FIRE 7–14 (2014); 
Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) & World Movement for Democracy Sec-
retariat at the Nat’l Endowment for Democracy (NED), Defending Civil Society, 
14 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 27–30 (2012); David Moore & Douglas Rutzen, 
Legal Framework for Global Philanthropy: Barriers and Opportunities, 13 INT’L 
J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 17–25 (2011); see also BARBARA UNMÜßIG, CIVIL SOCI-
ETY UNDER PRESSURE – SHRINKING – CLOSING – NO SPACE 4–8 (2016), https:// 
www.boell.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2015/12/20160601_civil_socieity_under 
_pressure_shrinking_spaces_englisch.pdf. 
 25. See Global Philanthropy and Remittances and International Develop-
ment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Multilateral, Int’l Dev., Multilateral 
Inst., and Int’l Econ., Energy, and Envtl. Policy of the S. Comm. on Foreign Re-
lations, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/global 
-philanthropy-and-remittances-and-international-development-050317 (includ-
ing testimony relating to restrictions on cross-border funding); Threats to Civil 
Society Around the World: Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Com-
mission, 115th Cong. (2017), https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/ 
hearings/threats-civil-society-around-world; Celebrating Global Philanthropy, 
HUDSON INST., http://www.hudson.org/events/1397-celebrating-global 
-philanthropy32017 (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (focusing in part on “government 
crackdowns on non-profits and cross-border financial flows”). 
 26. Natalia Bourjaily, Some Issues Related to Russia’s New NGO Law, 8 
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 4, 5–6 (2006). 
 27. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 1–2, 12; Oonagh B. 
Breen, Allies or Adversaries? Foundation Responses to Government Policing of 
Cross-Border Charity, 17 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 45, 63 n.85 (2015); Kiai, 
supra note 24, at 9. 
 2018] CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING 1213 
 
a registration requirement for entities may not seem onerous, 
and Russian officials even defended the requirement by stating 
it was based on a long-standing United States registration law.28 
In practice, however, the requirement has led many entities with 
foreign connections, including the Russian arm of the MacAr-
thur Foundation, to cease their activities in Russia completely.29 
The term foreign agent also has a strong stigmatizing effect in 
Russia, as it is commonly understood to mean foreign spy, which 
has tended to deter domestic support for registered NGOs, even 
as domestic requests for assistance from the same NGOs con-
tinue unabated.30 Failure to accept that label can trigger the ap-
plication of substantial fines.31 
As another example, China has recently shifted oversight of 
foreign NGOs to the Ministry of Public Security, China’s internal 
security agency, as well as imposing a burdensome registration 
process on such NGOs and limiting the areas—both subject mat-
ter and geographic—in which they can operate.32 These new le-
gal rules require any foreign NGO seeking to operate in China 
to partner with an approved domestic NGO, a requirement that 
can be difficult to satisfy.33 And the Chinese government has 
been slow to provide guidance to foreign NGOs on how to comply 
with the new law, leading some legal experts and nonprofit staff 
to speculate that it is doing so intentionally to render such 
 
 28. Ingrid Burke, “Foreign Agents” Under Russia’s NGO Law and Its US 
Doppelganger, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFO. AGENCY (July 27, 2012), http://www 
.rapsinews.com/legislation_publication/20120727/263954264.html. 
 29. See AMNESTY INT’L, AGENTS OF THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS OF “FOREIGN 
AGENTS” LAW IN RUSSIA: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOCIETY 1–6 (2016) (provid-
ing case studies illustrating the effect of Russia’s 2012 law on Russian NGOs); 
Meyer, supra note 3. 
 30. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 6; Françoise Daucé, The Duality 
of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on “Foreign Agents”, 23 DEMOKRATI-
ZATSIYA 57, 58 (2015); Françoise Daucé, The Government and Human Rights 
Groups in Russia: Civilized Oppression?, 10 J. CIV. SOC’Y 239, 242–43 (2014); 
Galina Goncharenko, Essays on Financial Accountability of Human Rights Or-
ganizations 138–41 (June 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Norwegian 
School of Economics), http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/64693/1/Goncharenko_IRRR_ 
Essays%20on%20financial%20accountability_PhD%20dissertation_14.09.pdf. 
 31. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 4, 31. 
 32. See The China NGO Project: About the China NGO Project, CHINAFILE, 
http://www.chinafile.com/ngo/about (last visited Dec. 5, 2017); Civic Freedom 
Monitor: China, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (ICNL), [hereinafter 
ICNL China], http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html (last updated 
June 9, 2017). 
 33. Chin, supra note 5. 
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groups technically illegal and therefore easier to control or ex-
pel.34 It also has been slow to register foreign NGOs since the 
law went into effect at the beginning of 2017, with only ninety 
registered during the first five months.35 
But these two countries are far from alone in this regard, as 
more than fifty countries have imposed such measures in recent 
years.36 The emergence of these restrictions is particularly dis-
heartening given the previous optimism regarding the growing, 
positive influence of NGOs in many countries with the end of the 
Cold War, the spread of technology, and other recent develop-
ments.37 In many countries these measures are particularly 
harmful to the domestic NGOs that relied on this support be-
cause they lack significant domestic support, usually because of 
a combination of potential donors’ fears of retaliation for sup-
porting the human rights or democratization efforts of the NGOs 
and the lack of a domestic philanthropic culture.38 
Only a handful of fully authoritarian governments have 
taken more extreme steps, such as dissolving or taking over 
many domestic NGOs.39 For example, in 2017 Egypt enacted a 
new law governing all NGOs that imposes stringent registration 
requirements enforced by heavy criminal penalties, which is 
widely viewed as an attack on the very existence of such organi-
zations.40 But subtler and, therefore, easier to justify restrictions 
 
 34. Chris Buckley, Uncertainty over New Chinese Law Rattles Foreign Non-
profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/ 
world/asia/china-foreign-ngo.html; Chin, supra note 5. 
 35. ICNL China, supra note 32. 
 36. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 7, 61; Darin Chris-
tensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to 
NGOs, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 77, 80 (2013); Kendra Dupuy et al., Hands Off My 
Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organ-
izations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries, 84 WORLD DEV. 299, 302 (2016). 
 37. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 2; Banks et al., 
supra note 20, at 707; Gerard Clarke, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and Politics in the Developing World, 46 POL. STUD. 36, 36 (1998); Jessica T. 
Matthews, Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 50, 
50–67 (1997); Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Pro-
tectionism, 17 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 3, 5–6 (2015). 
 38. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 5–6; JOHN CASEY, THE NON-
PROFIT WORLD: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RISE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 200 
(2015). 
 39. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
 40. Declan Walsh, Egypt’s President Enacts Law Placing Severe Re-
strictions on Aid Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2017, at A4; see also Aswat 
Masriya, Egypt: Political Parties, Rights Groups Reject NGO Law, ALLAFRICA 
(Nov. 15, 2016), http://allafrica.com/stories/201611151106.html (citing a joint 
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are more widespread, including in countries with governments 
usually characterized as semiauthoritarian or even relatively 
democratic.41 For example, India in 2010 passed a law imposing 
additional administrative requirements on domestic NGOs re-
ceiving foreign assistance and prohibiting foreign funding for 
any organizations of a “political nature,”42 and Hungary in 2017 
passed legislation to require domestic NGOs that receive foreign 
funding to publicly identify themselves and their donors, a step 
that many critics saw as part of a larger government effort to 
stigmatize and discredit such NGOs.43 
The specific legal restrictions on domestic NGOs receiving 
cross-border funding include: (1) significant additional registra-
tion and reporting obligations, sometimes including having to 
register in a manner that stigmatizes the NGO (Hungary, Indo-
nesia, Russia); (2) requiring advance government approval be-
fore accepting or seeking such funding (Belarus, India, Jordan); 
(3) significant taxes or the imposition of highly unfavorable ex-
change rates on such funding (Russia, Zimbabwe); (4) requiring 
such funding to be routed through government channels or to 
only be used for certain activities (Bolivia, Eritrea); (5) limiting 
the amount of such funding to a certain percentage of a domestic 
NGO’s budget (Ethiopia); and (6) prohibiting receipt of such 
funding for NGOs engaged in certain activities, which are often 
defined vaguely (India, Venezuela).44 The legal restrictions on 
 
statement from numerous political parties and civil society organizations stat-
ing the law, prior to approval, would set “a dangerous precedent” and treats 
“civil society as an enemy to be defeated through secret plots and laws”). 
 41. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 6–7 (stating semi-
authoritarian regimes constitute the “majority” of governments engaged in 
pushback against NGOs, but that even “relatively democratic governments” 
have “recently taken or seriously considered measures” to restrict NGOs); see 
also Helmet K. Anheier, Discussion Paper, Civil Society Challenged: Towards 
an Enabling Policy Environment, ECONOMICS 1, 10–11 (2017), http://www 
.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2017-45/file (proposing a 
G20-initiated independent commission to address state-civil society relations, 
including with respect to the shrinking space for civil society in some countries 
both within and outside of the G20). 
 42. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 9; see also Moore & 
Rutzen, supra note 24, at 20, 23 (discussing the restrictions India already im-
posed on domestic NGOs prior to the 2010 law). 
 43. Bienvenu & Karasz, supra note 5 (noting that, in addition to the law 
that critics state is meant to “stigmatize, discredit, and intimidate” NGOs, the 
Hungarian Government has also circulated biased questionnaires claiming cer-
tain NGOs are dangerous “to [Hungary’s] independence”). 
 44. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 8–11; UNMÜßIG, 
supra note 24, at 6–9, 12; Dupuy et al., supra note 36, at 311; Moore & Rutzen, 
supra note 24, at 7, 18–25; Rutzen, supra note 37, at 9–20. 
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foreign NGOs providing such funding include: (1) repeated and 
burdensome investigation of such funders (Kazakhstan, Russia); 
(2) refusing to register such NGOs and then accusing the NGOs 
of violating host country registration requirements (Jordan); (3) 
criminal prosecution of foreign NGO representatives (Egypt); 
and (4) expulsion from the host country (Azerbaijani, Ethio-
pia).45 Such legal rules are in addition to the creation of a hostile 
political environment for such funders and the domestic NGOs 
they support through critical public comments by senior govern-
ment officials and government-controlled communication out-
lets,46 and the imposition of more general legal barriers on the 
creation and operation of domestic NGOs.47 
In some countries, the restrictions vary based on the type of 
activity funded, with NGOs engaged in advocacy or human 
rights related activities more likely to be targeted, as opposed to 
NGOs engaged in less controversial activities, such as the provi-
sion of social services.48 Not all restrictions are so finally tuned, 
however. For example, the Russian laws discussed above have 
hit not only NGOs engaged primarily in the former types of ac-
tivities but also a charity involved in combating drug addiction 
and the spread of HIV (although the government also accuses of 
it of engaging in political activities).49 Similarly, the Turkish 
 
 45. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 12–15. 
 46. Id. at 11–12. 
 47. Survey of Trends Affecting Civic Space: 2015–16, GLOBAL TRENDS IN 
NGO LAW, Sept. 2016, at 2; see also BEN HAYES ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE, ON “SHRINKING SPACE”: A FRAMING PAPER 3 (Apr. 2017), https://www 
.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/on_shrinking_space_2.pdf (noting NGOs 
have recently been galvanized to understand and counter “shrinking space”); 
ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 13 (listing a host of legal barriers facing NGOs); 
Moore & Rutzen, supra note 24, at 25–27 (discussing “legal barriers that impede 
the development” of domestic NGOs that receive cross border funding). 
 48. See KATERINA HADZI-MICEVA EVANS, CONFERENCE OF INGOS OF THE 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPERT COUNCIL ON NGO LAW, REGULATING POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, OING Conf/Exp ¶¶ 1–5, 
46 (2015), https://rm.coe.int/1680640fc2 (noting that in some countries any ad-
vocacy or human rights work done by an NGO would fall under broad re-
strictions against “political activity”); Zymek, supra note 12, at 9 (stating one of 
the main arguments made against cross-border funded NGOs is that they ad-
vocate for a destabilization of government); Foreign Funding of NGOs: Donors: 
Keep Out, ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/ 
international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism 
-barring-non-governmental-organisations (stating that “NGOs focused on de-
mocracy-building or human rights are the most affected” by laws that limit 
cross-border funding). 
 49. See Ivan Watson et al., On the Front Lines of Russia’s “Staggering” HIV 
Epidemic, CNN (June 8, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/health/russia 
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government recently revoked the registration of Mercy Corps, 
forcing the U.S. charity, which is heavily involved in helping Syr-
ian civilians, to end its operations in Turkey.50 
The apparent advantage that most of these legal restrictions 
have over more draconian measures, such as wholesale closure 
of NGOs and seizure of their assets and records, is that such re-
strictions are easier to justify, thereby reducing exposure to neg-
ative international consequences that are likely to be triggered 
by blunter approaches. The countries that impose these re-
strictions often publicly argue for them based on a variety of con-
cerns, including promoting transparency and accountability, en-
suring cultural sensitivity and limiting cultural conflicts, 
controlling development priority setting, and combatting terror-
ism.51 Such concerns are certainly legitimate; for example, the 
risks of NGOs serving as conduits for financing terrorism has 
been well documented,52 although NGOs are not necessarily at 
greater risk in this regard than other types of entities.53 In part 
for this reason, in many instances government officials appear 
 
-hiv-epidemic/index.html (noting the Russian government’s decision to label the 
Rylkov Foundation a Foreign Agent, due to cross-border funding, has put its 
operation at risk). 
 50. Karen DeYoung & Dan Lamothe, Turkey Shuts Down a U.S. Aid Group 
That Helped Syrians, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/world/turkey-shuts-down-a-us-aid-group-that-helped-syrians/2017/03/07/ 
e510d272-0374-11e7-9d14-9724d48f5666_story.html; Rick Gladstone, Turkey 
Halts U.S. Charity That Aids Over 500,000 Syrians a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/middleeast/turkey-syria 
-mercy-corps.html. 
 51. ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 31–32; Kiai, supra note 24, at 8–13; 
Douglas Rutzen, Civil Society Under Assault, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 28, 31–33 
(2015). 
 52. See, e.g., GEOFFREY CORN ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 402–19 
(2015) (discussing economic sanctions and terrorist financing, and noting that 
the U.S. government designated over forty “purported charities” suspected of 
“providing financial support to terrorists or terrorist organizations”); JIMMY GU-
RULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF 
GLOBAL TERRORISM 117–47 (2008) (discussing “corrupt Islamic charities” not-
ing that they have been “one of the most important sources of funds” for many 
terrorist organizations); Matthew Levitt, Charitable Organizations and Terror-
ist Financing: A War on Terror Status-Check, WASH. INST. (Mar. 19, 2004), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable 
-organizations-and-terrorist-financing-a-war-on-terror-status-che (discussing 
charitable organizations that act as fronts for international terror groups). 
 53. See Rebecca Cooney, Charities Are “Not Inherently at Risk of Terrorist 
Abuse,” Financial Action Task Force Says, THIRD SECTOR (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/charities-not-inherently-risk-terrorist-abuse 
-financial-action-task-force-says/finance/article/1400767 (noting a global body 
that “sets counter-terrorism financing standards” stated “charities are not in-
herently at risk of terrorist abuse”). 
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sincerely to believe that the new rules are necessary to address 
these concerns.54 
The reasons why these restrictions have attracted such 
sharp criticism, however, is that they often go well beyond what 
is required to address these concerns, including because of broad 
grants of discretionary power to government officials that effec-
tively cut off foreign support of domestic NGOs without sufficient 
justification. For example, failure to register under the pejora-
tive label “foreign agent[]” in Russia has led not only to warnings 
and court actions, but also substantial fines.55 In China, even 
before the most recent round of legal changes there was a system 
of “graduated controls” under which government authorities 
could arbitrarily penalize or even shut down NGOs that engaged 
in disapproved activities.56 As a result, these new restrictions 
have often proven to be quite effective in dissuading domestic 
NGOs from seeking such funding or using it for disfavored activ-
ities, and foreign NGOs from providing it, causing shifts in the 
activities of NGOs and, in some instances, their closure.57 In con-
trast, less controversial laws in other countries, such as the U.S. 
Foreign Agents Registration Act that requires the registration of 
persons who act in the interests of a foreign principal and at the 
direction of that foreign principal (including receiving a major 
part of the person’s financing from that foreign principal), tend 
to be more limited in scope, not designed to stigmatize or dele-
gitimize the affected entities, and weakly enforced.58 
Even laws that on their face may appear reasonable and so 
consistent with international law often are more troubling when 
considered in context, including government statements and 
other actions demonstrating hostility toward some or all NGOs. 
For example, the recent Hungarian legislation noted earlier re-
quiring NGOs receiving cross-border funding to identify them-
selves and their donors has drawn criticism in part because of 
 
 54. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 21 (noting in some cases gov-
ernments are sincerely attempting to address terrorist financing concerns “but 
fail to strike a balance with other priorities”). 
 55. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 20. 
 56. Shawn Shieh, Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society in China, in NGO 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 45, 53 (Reza Hasmath & Jennifer 
Y.J. Hsu eds., 2016). 
 57. ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 19–20; Kiai, supra note 24, at 5. 
 58. See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2012); Ja-
had Atieh, Comment, Foreign Agents: Updating FARA To Protect American De-
mocracy, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1061–63, 1067 (2010) (discussing FARA’s 
effect and scope while noting enforcement by the Department of Justice has 
been “abysmal”). 
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long-standing concerns regarding the current government’s ap-
parent hostility to human rights.59 For this reason, commenta-
tors have concluded that many of these restrictions on cross-bor-
der funding are actually motivated by the desire to silence critics 
and maintain power.60 
It is important to note, however, that these restrictions usu-
ally do not reach domestic NGOs that avoid foreign support or 
other foreign connections, although some countries have also 
targeted NGOs more generally.61 In fact, many of the countries 
imposing restrictions relating to cross-border funding of NGOs 
are at the same time encouraging the growth of purely domestic 
NGOs that engage in activities the government deems to be ben-
eficial for society.62 For example, China has actively supported a 
sharp increase in the number of NGOs that provide domestic so-
cial services and promote social enterprise.63 It has also seen an 
increase in registered NGOs generally, from no more than a cou-
ple thousand in the late 1980s to more than 600,000 in 2014,64 
 
 59. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. DOC. (RSP 2656) (2017) (detailing human rights 
concerns in Hungary). 
 60. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, CLOSING SPACE AND FRAGILITY, FRAGILITY 
STUDY GROUP 2–3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Fragility 
-Report-Policy-Brief-Closing-Space-and-Fragility.pdf (discussing the rise of civil 
society organizations and “power holders” attempts to “put the civil society ge-
nie back in the bottle”). 
 61. For examples of the latter, see Benjamin Novak, Daggers Are Out for 
Civil Society in Hungary, BUDAPEST BEACON (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www 
.budapestbeacon.com/daggers-civil-society-hungary (noting the push by the 
Orbán government to denigrate and oust civil society organizations); Noreen 
Ohlrich, NGOs Fear the Forcible Shrinking of Civil Society in Poland, NON-
PROFIT Q. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/12/07/ngos-fear 
-forcible-shrinking-civil-society-poland (discussing the potential effects of a bill 
designed to create a “Civil Society Department” to “oversee and centralize the 
public funding of charities”); see also ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 14–21 
(listing examples of countries imposing legal restrictions that either create bar-
riers to forming new NGOs or restrict legitimate activities of NGOs). 
 62. See CASEY, supra note 38, at 292 (stating that some authoritarian re-
gimes “denounce [NGOs] as instruments of extremist special interests” yet 
many of those same regimes have benefited by “organizing through [NGOs]”). 
 63. Shieh, supra note 56, at 52–53; Mark Sidel, Regulation of Nonprofit and 
Philanthropic Organizations: An International Perspective, NONPROFIT Q. (July 
25, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/07/25/regulation-nonprofit 
-philanthropy-international-non-profit-organizations. 
 64. Zhang Yuanfeng, Presentation at CCSS, JHU, Opening or Closing the 
Space for Civil Society in China? Two Tales of a Reality, at 4 (Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/02/Zhang_Seminar_2 
.11.2016.pdf; see also CASEY, supra note 38, at 295 (reporting similar figures). 
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and there may be millions of additional, unregistered NGOs.65 
Similarly, India has seen an increase in registered NGOs from 
144,000 in 1970 to more than a million after 2000.66 In Russia 
the government has taken steps to support NGOs that provide 
social services, even while imposing the restrictions noted previ-
ously on NGOs that receive cross-border funding.67 While diffi-
cult to measure for a variety of reasons, including varying com-
pliance with registration rules and changes in such rules over 
time, there are relatively strong data indicating that the number 
of NGOs is increasing in many, if not most, countries.68 This may 
be why the most comprehensive current measure of the strength 
of civil society (defined in a manner consistent with the defini-
tion of NGO used in this article, except not including political 
parties or religious organizations primarily focused on spiritual 
practices), the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) Core Civil So-
ciety Index, does not indicate a sharp decline in such strength in 
any world region in recent years (through 2012).69 At the same 
time, however, it does show a recent, sharp decline in at least 
one country (Russia) that has been increasingly restrictive with 
respect to cross-border funding of NGOs.70 
The “closing space” narrative is therefore not simply a story 
of governments seeking to shut down NGOs for reasons that 
clearly violate international law. It is rather a story of govern-
ments picking and choosing which types of NGOs to favor and 
disfavor, often based in large part on connections to foreign fun-
ders, and then ratcheting up otherwise legitimate registration, 
reporting, and other requirements to a point where the disfa-
vored NGOs are forced to abandon their disliked activities and 
 
 65. See Wang Xinsong et al., Giving in China: An Emerging Nonprofit Sec-
tor Embedded Within a Strong State, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
PHILANTHROPY 354, 355 (Pamela Wiepking & Femida Handy eds., 2015) (esti-
mating the total number of registered and unregistered NGOs in China “range 
between two and four million”). 
 66. CASEY, supra note 38, at 22. 
 67. See Irina Mersianova et al., Giving in Russia: The Difficult Shaping of 
the New Nonprofit Regime, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL PHILAN-
THROPY, supra note 65, at 249, 252. 
 68. See CASEY, supra note 38, at 21–22 (noting that while definitive figures 
are unavailable and “growth may not be constant . . . the upward trend [in 
NGOs] is the norm around the world”). 
 69. See Bernhard et al., supra note 13, at 7–8, 14–16 fig.4 (explaining how 
the Index is calculated and showing civil society strength by region based on V-
Dem’s calculation). 
 70. Id. at 19–20 fig.7 (noting the sharp decline since 2000 corresponds to 
Putin’s rule, which subjected civil society organizations to the “heavy hand of 
the state”). 
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disfavored funding sources, or even to cease their operations en-
tirely.71 It is also complicated by the difficulty of demonstrating 
that such restrictions are unduly burdensome when purportedly 
based on legitimate government interests. The next Section ex-
plains why such burdensome legal requirements are contrary to 
international law and yet are difficult to challenge under exist-
ing international human rights treaties. 
C. THE GAP BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE 
Numerous agreements, resolutions, and court decisions in-
volving internationally recognized human rights have implica-
tions for the ability of NGOs to receive funding and other re-
sources, including across borders.72 More specifically, Article 20 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.”73 Building on this right, Article 22 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “Covenant”) 
limits the restrictions that may be placed on the exercise of free-
 
 71. See, e.g., Deyong Yin, China’s Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs, 8 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 521, 536 (2009) (“[T]he state seeks to foster certain 
types of foreign NGOs and to quell those with politically sensitive agendas.”); 
Jamie Dettmer, Aid Groups Fear Mass Expulsion of Western NGOs from Turkey, 
VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/aid-gropus-fear 
-mass-expulsion-of-western-ngos-from-turkey/3760749.html (quoting a U.N. 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs read-out stating that the 
Turkish government was likely to use a planned requirement that all interna-
tional NGOs resubmit registration requests as a “way to choose which organi-
zations they want to keep in the country”). 
 72. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41–42 (discuss-
ing the right to freedom of association “guaranteed by multiple international 
human rights agreements” and its effect on NGOs); ICNL & NED, supra note 
24, at 36–56 (discussing international principles designed to “protect civil soci-
ety from repressive intrusions of government”); Kiai, supra note 24, at 7–13 
(noting that constraining NGOs from receiving foreign funding does not comply 
with Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); 
Rutzen, supra note 37, at 33–42 (discussing the international legal framework 
effecting NGOs cross-border funding); Josel Nivera Mostajo, Access to Justice 
and the Right to an Effective Remedy in International Human Rights Law and 
International Investment Arbitration: The Case of International Non-Govern-
mental and Non-Profit Organizations 20–26 (May 10, 2013) (unpublished LL.M. 
thesis, University of Notre Dame) (on file with author) (discussing a variety of 
internationally recognized rights NGOs may claim and potential ways to en-
force said rights). 
 73. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20, 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
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dom of association to those “prescribed by law and which are nec-
essary in a democratic society,”74 and this protection likely ex-
tends to restrictions relating to accessing financial and other re-
sources from both domestic and foreign sources.75 Similarly, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144, commonly 
known as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights De-
fenders, provides in its Article 13 that everyone has the right, 
both individually and in association with others, to seek and re-
ceive resources for the purpose of protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms through peaceful means.76 Other resolu-
tions by both the United Nations General Assembly and the 
United Nations Human Rights Council elaborate further on the 
right to seek and receive needed resources to vindicate freedom 
of association.77 Finally, a number of regional bodies have also 
recognized this right under international law, including within 
the regional human rights systems established in the Americas 
and Europe.78 
 
 74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 22, ¶ 2, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 75. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41 (stating 
measures that “limit independent civil society usually fail” to meet Article 22 
requirements); ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 52 (“Funding restrictions that 
stifle the ability of [NGOs] to pursue their goals may well constitute unjustifia-
ble interference with freedom of association.”); Kiai, supra note 24, at 6 (“[F]un-
draising activities are protected under article 22 of the Covenant, and funding 
restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory ac-
tivities constitute an interference with article 22.”); Rutzen, supra note 37, at 
33 (noting that restrictions on NGOs’ ability to fundraise likely violates Article 
22). 
 76. G.A. Res. 53/144, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144, Declaration on the 
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Pro-
mote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 13 (Mar. 8, 1999). 
 77. E.g., Human Rights Council Res. 32/31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.29 (July 
1, 2016); see also U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Practical Recom-
mendations for the Creation and Maintenance of a Safe and Enabling Environ-
ment for Civil Society, Based on Good Practices and Lessons Learned, ¶¶ 72, 75, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/20 (Apr. 11, 2016) (stating “predictability of core funding” 
is essential for NGOs to “work effectively and independently” and that “[w]here 
no restrictions on the receipt of foreign funds apply to State institutions or busi-
nesses, the same should apply to civil society organizations”); Breen, supra note 
27, at 52–54 (discussing various U.N. Resolutions dealing with the right to seek 
resources); Kiai, supra note 24, at 6 (discussing the same); Rutzen, supra note 
37, at 33–35 (discussing the same). 
 78. E.g., Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)14 of the Com-
mittee of Ministers to Member States on the Legal Status of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in Europe ¶ 50 (Oct. 10, 2007) (stating “NGOs should be free to 
solicit and receive funding” limited only to the laws “applicable to customs, for-
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There is a gap, however, between the aspirations of interna-
tional law and the actual practices of many countries for several 
reasons. One reason is the limited legal reach of the relevant in-
ternational law authorities—they simply are not binding on all 
countries. Only 169 countries have ratified the Covenant, with 
China being the most prominent country not included in that 
number (although China signed the Covenant in 1998).79 Even 
critics of these new restrictions acknowledge that the various 
United Nations declarations are not legally binding, although 
they arguably reflect an emerging soft-law consensus.80 And 
while statements by regional bodies may reflect correct state-
ments of laws within their region, their reach is limited to those 
regions and the efficacy of the treaties upon which they are 
based.81 
Another reason for this gap between international law and 
actual practices are barriers that limit the parties that may in-
voke the protections provided and when they may do so. Under 
the original text of the Covenant, only states that are party to 
the Covenant and have recognized the competence of the Human 
Rights Committee that monitors compliance with the Covenant 
may invoke the Committee’s authority to investigate and at-
tempt to resolve alleged failures by another state to fulfill its ob-
 
eign exchange, money laundering and those on the funding of elections and po-
litical parties”); INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT ON 
THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE AMERICAS 73, 235 (2011) 
(stating the right to receive cross-border funding to promote human rights is 
protected by freedom of association and states should allow human rights or-
ganizations to seek cross border funding); see CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, 
supra note 24, at 42–43 box 4 (listing regional organizations that have weighed 
in on the matter); Evered, supra note 10, at 171 (stating “the European Conven-
tion on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Govern-
mental Organizations . . . obligates ratifying states to recognize” and protect in-
ternational NGOs); Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 530–31 (discussing the 
European and American Convention on Human Rights and noting these con-
ventions may protect the right of association); ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 
54 (listing various regional bodies and their recognition of the right to freedom 
of association); Rutzen, supra note 37, at 35 (listing examples of cross-border 
funding protections provided by regional bodies). 
 79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume% 
20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).  
 80. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41–42; Kiai, supra 
note 24, at 6–7. 
 81. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 530–32. 
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ligations under the Covenant—and then only if all domestic rem-
edies have been invoked and exhausted.82 Under an optional pro-
tocol ratified by 115 countries, individuals may also submit com-
plaints of alleged failures by those countries to the Committee, 
but again they are subject to exhaustion of domestic remedies.83 
NGOs and others may also submit shadow or alternative reports 
when a country that has ratified the Covenant submits its re-
quired reports to the Committee, but the Committee is not re-
quired to even consider such alternative reports (although it ap-
pears to usually do so), much less to act on them.84 As for 
regional human rights bodies, while natural persons in covered 
states and sometimes even legal entities from those states, in-
cluding NGOs, may invoke the dispute resolution procedures 
available with respect to those bodies in Africa, the Americas, 
and Europe, they generally may only do so after exhausting do-
mestic remedies.85 Some still existing Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation treaties entered into on a bilateral basis between 
the United States and several countries also provide protection 
for foreign involvement in NGOs, but only countries may assert 
claims under such treaties.86 
A third reason is the lack of effective enforcement mecha-
nisms, even if a state, natural person, or NGO successfully in-
vokes the protections of binding international law with respect 
to cross-border funding of NGOs. The Human Rights Committee 
may seek resolution of an inter-state dispute under the Cove-
nant and may communicate its views regarding a failure alleged 
 
 82. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74, 
art. 41, ¶ 1. 
 83. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966); 
Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Paradigm, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 730–31 (2007). 
 84. See Human Rights Comm., The Relationship of the Human Rights Com-
mittee with Non-Governmental Organizations, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/104/3 (June 
4, 2012) (noting that shadow reports play an important role in “enhancing” the 
Covenant). 
 85. Choi, supra note 83, at 730–31; Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 
531; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human 
Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 915–22 (2011). 
 86. International Investment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organiza-
tions 2–3 (Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), Working Paper, May 2008), 
http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/BITNPOProtection2.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ICNL Treaty Protection]; see also John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 
343–44 (2013) (arguing that FCN treaties have become increasingly irrelevant 
over time, only successfully invoked recently in a few, narrow areas). 
 2018] CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING 1225 
 
by an individual under the optional protocol, but the Committee 
has no authority to penalize a state for not agreeing to a resolu-
tion or for not correcting a found failure beyond publicizing the 
state’s action or inaction.87 Instead, the Committee only has con-
ciliatory powers and so does not have the authority to make a 
judicial determination, but may only communicate its views on 
a matter in dispute.88 While the Covenant arguably obligates 
states to create domestic means of addressing failures, the Com-
mittee faces the same limitations when seeking to enforce this 
obligation.89 The African, Americas, and European regional hu-
man rights bodies have more significant enforcement tools, but 
even for those bodies the record of state compliance with ordered 
remedies is mixed at best.90 
The existence of this gap and the reasons for it should not 
obscure the country-specific options for challenging legal rules 
that impose undue burdens on cross-border funding of NGOs. 
These options include pushing back against overly burdensome 
application of such rules, including in domestic courts;91 oppos-
ing the enactment of such legal rules by domestic lawmaking 
bodies in the first place (or advocating their repeal if previously 
 
 87. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants of 
Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 219–20 
(1995); see also Choi, supra note 83, at 740 (“[R]ecommendations issued by hu-
man rights bodies such as the Human Rights Committee lack binding effects 
and enforcement power.”); Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Individual Commu-
nications, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://ohchr 
.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx# 
whathappens (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Treaty Bodies] (see the 
“What happens once a Committee decides a case?” entry, which includes what 
happens when the Human Rights Committee decides a case). 
 88. Brudner, supra note 87, at 220; Treaty Bodies, supra note 87. 
 89. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, Domestic Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Pursuant to Its Article 2 Para. 2, 5 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 399, 435 (2001) (noting that states that have not created 
domestic means to address failures have “attracted criticism” from the Commit-
tee). 
 90. Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human Rights Un-
der Regional Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis, 53–54, 57–59, 62–63 (Jan. 
1, 2006) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Georgia), http:// 
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/80. 
 91. See, e.g., Shashank Bengali, Court Orders Indian Government To Re-
lease Greenpeace Funds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/ 
world/asia/la-fg-india-greenpeace-funds-20150120-story.html (describing how 
the Delhi High Court ordered the Indian government to release more than 
$310,000 in funds provided by Greenpeace International for its India office after 
finding that preventing that office from receiving foreign funding was unconsti-
tutional). 
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enacted);92 and urging other states, international organizations, 
and other international actors to highlight these legal rules and 
their inconsistency with international law.93 Host country NGOs 
can also use cross-border funding and other assistance for capac-
ity building and developing domestic support, so that in the long 
run they are no longer reliant on foreign support.94 But identify-
ing and implementing the particular method or methods that are 
most likely to be successful in a given country can be difficult 
and time consuming, so it is desirable to consider whether any 
more comprehensive and effective international legal protec-
tions exist or realistically could be created to combat the increas-
ing legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs. This con-
sideration brings us to the promise of investment treaties. 
II.  THE PROMISE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES   
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral in-
vestment treaties (collectively “investment treaties”) provide 
several significant advantages over the international agree-
ments discussed previously and therefore have the potential to 
close the gap between law and practice. First, and as detailed 
further below, many countries that are not party to the Conven-
tion or regional human rights agreements are parties to invest-
ment treaties.95 Second, in general, investment treaties explic-
itly provide that aggrieved private parties covered by a given 
treaty may bring a claim against the states that are parties to 
 
 92. See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, ANNUAL REPORT 2015–
16, at 4 [ hereinafter ICNL ANNUAL REPORT] (discussing a successful opposition 
in Kyrgyzstan to a proposed foreign agent registration law for NGOs that re-
ceive foreign donations and engage in “political activity”). 
 93. See CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing campaigns to block 
closing-space legislation and noting the best campaigns “combine a coordinated 
international effort” and are led by “a diverse domestic coalition of civil society 
actors”); CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 62 (noting one way 
to push back is by “bolstering international normative and legal frameworks 
that undergird civil society access to foreign resources and assistance”); ICNL 
& NED, supra note 24, at 57–59 (discussing various ways of “protecting and 
enhancing civil society space”); Moore & Rutzen, supra note 24, at 37–38 (stat-
ing that “[s]trategic outreach” to the international community can be “instru-
mental in influencing law and policy at the national level in various countries” 
and listing examples of such outreach). 
 94. See, e.g., Kingsley Ighobor, Africa’s Civil Society Faces Up to Hostile 
Governments, EURASIA REV. (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.eurasiareview.com/ 
13082016-africas-civil-society-faces-up-to-hostile-governments (describing in 
part efforts by civil society organizations in African countries with restrictive 
rules to develop domestic financial and other support). 
 95. See infra note 107. 
 2018] CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING 1227 
 
the treaty, without the need to involve or obtain the consent of 
their home state and usually without the need to first exhaust 
domestic remedies (although preliminary procedures designed to 
encourage settlement are often required),96 and even when there 
is an exhaustion requirement, it may be possible to avoid its ap-
plication.97 Third, almost all such treaties provide for interna-
tional arbitration to resolve any disputes, with the arbitration 
decision generally enforceable in domestic courts in most coun-
tries.98 These provisions are particularly important because they 
represent consent by the states that are parties to the treaties, 
which is necessary to subject them both to such arbitration and 
to national court enforcement of arbitration decisions.99 This is 
not to say that such treaties have been uniformly viewed as suc-
cessful in resolving investment-related disputes, but they have 
shifted the focus of such disputes away from host country courts 
(with their risk of host country bias) to more neutral interna-
tional arbitration bodies.100 There are, however, several legal 
hurdles that an NGO would have to clear in order to successfully 
invoke the protection of an investment treaty, including whether 
the states involved are party to such an agreement, jurisdic-
 
 96. Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International In-
vestment Law and National State Liability: A Functional and Comparative 
View, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 735 
(Stephen W. Schill ed., 2010); Choi, supra note 83, at 732; David Gaukrodger & 
Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the In-
vestment Policy Community 10, 15 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Working 
Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2012/03, 2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance 
-and-investment/investor-state-dispute-settlement_5k46b1r85j6f-en. 
 97. See Stephen R. Halpin III, Note, Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Re-
public of Argentina and the Vitality of Host-Country Litigation Requirements in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1979, 2012–16 (2014) 
(discussing the effects of the United States Supreme Court upholding an inter-
national arbitration agreement procured after bypassing a host country’s legal 
system). 
 98. Choi, supra note 83, at 741; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 
64. 
 99. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44 (2009); Gary Born, A New 
Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 828–29, 836–37 
(2012). 
 100. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: 
State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. 
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199 (2008) (discussing the flawed and incon-
sistent outcomes in certain investment-related disputes submitted to an inter-
national arbitration tribunal); Choi, supra note 83 (discussing the pros and cons 
of investor-state dispute settlements and the lessons to be learned moving for-
ward). 
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tional limitations, and being able to state a covered cause of ac-
tion that can be addressed through an available remedy.101 In 
addition, and as will be discussed below, the limitation of avail-
able remedies to monetary damages under most, if not all, in-
vestment treaties is a significant disadvantage when it comes to 
challenging restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs. 
A. STATE PARTIES 
In common with the international agreements that specifi-
cally protect freedom of association, investment treaties are only 
binding on the states that are party to them.102 The number of 
such agreements continues to grow: in 2006, there were approx-
imately 2500 BITs and three multilateral investment treaties 
that were the equivalent of another 2000 BITs;103 in 2015, there 
were over 2900 BITs, plus an additional 358 other types of inter-
national investment agreements, some of which contain BIT-
equivalent provisions. The pace of growth for investment trea-
ties and other types of international investment agreements, 
however, has slowed since 2007.104 While these figures can be 
parsed further given differences among BITs, it is generally 
agreed that even limiting the count to relatively strong BITs 
(that is, ones that reflect the dominant current approach to such 
treaties by including a comprehensive, effective advance com-
mitment by the state parties to investor-initiated arbitration) re-
veals a similarly fast rate of growth.105 In addition, countries 
that are not parties to the Covenant or any regional human 
rights agreements may be parties to numerous investment trea-
ties.106 For example, China has not ratified the Covenant and is 
 
 101. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
 102. See supra, notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 103. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 532. 
 104. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Invest-
ment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, 101, 
UNCTAD/WIR/2016 [hereinafter UNCTAD 2016]. The existing multilateral 
treaties that provide foreign direct investment protection include the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Chapter 11). See NEWCOMBE 
& PARADELL, supra note 99, at 53–54; Born, supra note 99, at 834; Jason Webb 
Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 434 (2008); UNCTAD 2016, supra, at 105–
06. 
 105. Yackee, supra note 104, at 423–25, 427–29. 
 106. For the three major regional human rights treaties, fifty-three coun-
tries have ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, twenty-
five countries have ratified or acceded to the American Convention on Human 
Rights (plus the United States has signed but not ratified that agreement), and 
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not party to any regional human rights treaty, but it is party to 
110 BITs and another nineteen treaties with investment provi-
sions currently in force.107 Of the twenty-eight other countries 
that are eligible to ratify the Covenant but have not done so, 
seven are not party to a regional human rights treaty but have 
a significant number of BITs and a number of other treaties with 
investment provisions currently in force (Cuba, Malaysia, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emir-
ates).108 
It is also necessary for an NGO providing cross-border fund-
ing to be from a country with an applicable investment treaty 
with the host country in order to invoke the protections provided 
by that treaty.109 To the extent that is not the case, however, it 
often will be possible to create an entity in a different state that 
does have such an agreement and use that entity to provide the 
funding in order to overcome this hurdle. For-profit investors 
have in fact used this strategy with significant success.110 Some 
 
forty-seven countries have ratified or acceded to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See American 
Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32): Signatories 
and Ratifications, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_ 
American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2017); 
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005: Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., http:// 
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/ 
signatures?p_auth=3oT2oPOE (last updated May 10, 2017); Ratification Table: 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
 107. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development: Investment Policy 
Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator, http:// 
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2017); Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2017); see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 56–57. 
 108. See supra notes 106–07. 
 109. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 110. See SUZY H. NIKIEMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BEST PRAC-
TICES DEFINITION OF INVESTOR 3 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_ 
practices_definition_of_investor.pdf; Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civi-
lization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1278–80 (2009); 
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 55–57 (discussing treaty shopping by 
investors); Christoph Schreuer, Investments, International Protection ¶¶ 33–34, 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/ 
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1533?rskey 
=qbHuB9&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated June 2013). See generally 
UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 171–81 (discussing the effect ownership 
structures of multinational entities has on the coverage and reach of interna-
tional investment agreements). 
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investment treaties deny their protections for entities formed in 
a particular country solely to gain access to that treaty, however, 
and this may be a growing trend.111 For example, such a “denial 
of benefits” provision is included in the U.S. Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty.112 In addition, while the recent European Un-
ion-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement 
only has a relatively limited denial of benefits provision, it also 
includes a general good faith provision that could bar some at-
tempts to obtain treaty protection in this manner.113 So the re-
quirement that both the cross-border funder and the recipient of 
the cross-border funding be located in countries who are party to 
the same investment treaty could prove an obstacle to some po-
tential claims against restrictions on such funding. 
B. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
If a particular foreign-NGO/domestic-NGO relationship is 
potentially covered by an investment treaty because the two 
NGOs are in countries that are both parties to such an agree-
ment, there are still several jurisdictional issues that the foreign 
NGO would have to overcome. These issues include temporal ju-
risdiction, personal jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.114 
Temporal jurisdiction is relatively straightforward: was the 
legal restriction imposed on the cross-border funding during the 
 
 111. See RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); Bjorklund, supra 
note 110, at 1278 & n.44; UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 174. 
 112. U.S. STATE DEP’T: BUREAU OF ECON. AFFAIRS, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILAT-
ERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 17 (2012), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit 
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT]. 
 113. See Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-Eu-
ropean Union, arts. 8.16, 8.18(3), Sept. 14, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L11) 23, http:// 
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf; see also 
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶¶ 539–54, 588 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), https://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf (discussing when the re-
structuring of an investment in order to fall within the scope of protection of a 
given treaty is an abuse of rights and so should fail, and concluding that such 
an abuse of rights occurred in the case). 
 114. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 534–35; MacKenzie, supra note 
10, at 222–33 (discussing the various jurisdictional requirements in arbitra-
tions); ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 7–10 (discussing how a treaty’s 
definition of terms like investment may affect jurisdiction); see also Bjorklund, 
supra note 110, at 1274 (discussing temporal requirements for jurisdiction). It 
could be argued that the temporal aspect is better viewed as a procedural issue, 
but the exact terminology is not critical here. 
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time period when the investment treaty was in effect?115 Even if 
a country enacted the restriction prior to the applicable treaty’s 
enactment, temporal jurisdiction generally will be satisfied if the 
application of that restriction at issue occurred during the same 
period when the treaty was in effect.116 In addition, the aging of 
existing investment agreements and the fact that most of the re-
strictions unduly burdening cross-border funding of NGOs are of 
relatively recent vintage means that in many, probably most, sit-
uations temporal jurisdiction will exist.117 
Personal jurisdiction is trickier because the parties pro-
tected by investment agreements depend on the exact language 
of the agreement at issue, which can vary significantly. In some 
agreements, nonprofit or noncommercial entities are either ex-
plicitly covered or the definition of the covered entities is very 
broad, and so likely includes NGOs.118 For example, the current 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides standing to 
bring claims to any “enterprise” of a (state) party to the agree-
ment, with enterprise defined so as to include entities consti-
tuted or organized under applicable law “whether or not for 
profit.”119 
Such a broad definition appears to be the prevailing trend 
in investment treaties.120 Some treaties may clearly not include 
nonprofit or noncommercial entities, however, or may fail to pro-
vide any guidance on this point, leaving personal jurisdiction 
over NGOs uncertain.121 For example, a draft of the recent India 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty only covered an “enterprise” 
with “real and substantial business operations” in the host state, 
which it further defined as having “made a substantial and long 
term commitment of capital . . . ; engaged a substantial number 
of employees . . . ; made a substantial contribution to the devel-
opment of the Host State . . . ; and carried out all of its operations 
 
 115. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1282; Gallus & Peterson, supra note 
10, at 535. 
 116. See, e.g., Gami Invs. v. Mexico, 44 I.L.M. 545, 560–61 (2005); ICNL 
Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 20. 
 117. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1282; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra 
note 96, at 65. 
 118. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 535–36. 
 119. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, at art. 1. 
 120. See Marie-France Houde, Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 143, 145 
(2006). 
 121. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 535–36. 
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in accordance with the Law of the Host State.”122 This relatively 
narrow definition, as compared to an earlier India Model Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty, was an intentional decision by the In-
dian government to develop a more host-country-friendly 
model.123 The final version of the new Model Treaty slightly loos-
ened this specific definition, but remained narrower than the old 
version it replaced.124 
Many, if not most, investment treaties also give standing to 
the state parties to bring claims, but to date it appears states 
only very rarely choose to exercise this right.125 And even if a 
state chooses to bring a suit, it is usually limited to bringing suits 
under the treaty relating to the interpretation of the treaty, as 
opposed to a suit pursuing a claim for a particular investor.126 It 
may, however, be able to bring a claim on behalf of a particular 
investor as a matter of diplomatic protection more generally, as 
long as the investor has not already filed a claim under the 
treaty.127 An interesting possible ramification of this limitation 
is that a host country facing a claim from an NGO that receives 
a significant amount of home-country government funding, or 
has close ties to that government, might argue that the NGO is 
effectively an arm of its home-country government and therefore 
subject to any treaty-specific limitations on the ability of a state 
 
 122. Draft, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1.2 
(2015), https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text% 
20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. 
 123. See Nikesh Patel, Note, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A 
Shift To Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 273, 283–88 (2017) (discussing the difference between India’s 
old and new model BITs, and the motivations driving those changes). 
 124. GOV’T OF INDIA: DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 1 (2015), http://finmin.nic.in/sites/default/ 
files/ModelTextIndia_BIT%20%281%29.pdf?download=1 [hereinafter 2015 IN-
DIA MODEL BIT]. 
 125. E.g., Ecuador v. United States, Case No. 2012-5, Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7940 
.pdf (analyzing standing arguments from both parties and determining there 
was no standing due to the lack of a dispute as defined under the applicable 
BIT); see Nick Gallus, Protection of Non-Governmental Organizations in Egypt 
Under the Egypt-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, 14 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
L. 62, 69 (2012); UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 172–75 (discussing the var-
ious factors that convey standing). 
 126. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HIS-
TORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 499 (2010). 
 127. See Enrico Milano, The Investment Arbitration Between Italy and Cuba: 
The Application of Customary International Law Under Scrutiny, 11 LAW & 
PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 499, 507–08 (2012). 
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party to bring a claim.128 It should also be noted that at least the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”) 
precludes a parallel diplomatic convention case while a claim 
brought by an investor against a host country is in arbitration; 
so an NGO pursuing a claim under that convention could not 
also have its home country pursue such a case at the same 
time.129 
The most difficult jurisdictional issue for an NGO engaged 
in cross-border funding likely would be subject matter jurisdic-
tion, given that temporal and personal jurisdiction usually will 
exist.130 This is because investment treaties generally only apply 
to “investments,” although the definition of investment tends to 
be broadly worded.131 For example, the current U.S. Model Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty defines an investment as “every asset 
that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has 
the characteristics of an investment, including such characteris-
tics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expec-
tation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk” and then pro-
vides a nonexclusive list of forms that an investment may take, 
including equity interests, debt interests, various contracts, var-
ious other rights, and other property and related property 
rights.132 The use of the term “or” between “expectation of gain 
or profit” and “assumption of risk” indicates that only one of the 
commitment of capital or other resources or the expectation of 
gain or profit or the assumption of risk is required for there to be 
an investment for purposes of the treaty. Since cross-border 
funding of a domestic NGO necessarily involves a commitment 
of capital or other resources, and arguably also involves an as-
sumption of risk (if only that the funds may not be used for their 
designated purpose), such funding would appear to fall within 
 
 128. See Zymek, supra note 12, at 34–35. 
 129. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States art. 27, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 130. Although the definition of investment, which can be characterized as a 
subject matter jurisdiction issue, is also relevant to who qualifies as an investor, 
which can be characterized as a personal jurisdiction issue. See Gallus & Peter-
son, supra note 10, at 535–36. 
 131. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 65–66; Bjorklund, supra 
note 110, at 1280. 
 132. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, at art. 1. This relatively broad 
definition was also in the previous U.S. MODEL BIT. Mark Kantor, Little Has 
Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 27 ICSID REV. 335, 
345–46 (2012). 
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the terms of the model treaty and so any investment treaties us-
ing the same definition.133 Along the same lines, some invest-
ment treaties define investment negatively, with only a very lim-
ited number of items excluded from the term (and with items 
that might encompass cross-border funding of a domestic NGO 
generally not in that exclusion list).134 
Such a broad definition appears to the prevailing trend in 
investment treaties.135 There are, however, at least two other, 
somewhat common definitions.136 One of those other definitions 
provides that a covered investment is limited to one with an en-
terprise basis, by requiring a party seeking treaty benefits to 
have established an “enterprise” in the host state, with the defi-
nition of enterprise potentially excluding noncommercial enti-
ties.137 The other common definition limits covered investments 
to an inclusive list of covered assets, which may not be broad 
enough to reach cross-border funding of a domestic NGO.138 Fur-
thermore, some arbitrators have held that an investment gener-
ally must be commercially oriented or intended to generate a 
profit to fall within the protections of an investment treaty, even 
in the face of a broad definition for investment in the applicable 
treaty.139 
There is also a second, related subject-matter jurisdictional 
issue that is relevant to claims relating to cross-border funding 
of NGOs. If the home country and host country are both parties 
to the ICSID Convention and the applicable investment treaty 
permits use of International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) facilities for the arbitration, then a 
 
 133. See Mostajo, supra note 72, at 42–46 (discussing the low jurisdictional 
barrier set by such broad definitions of investment). 
 134. See, e.g., 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, art. 1.4 (listing the 
types of assets not included within the definition of investment); Houde, supra 
note 120, at 149 (discussing article 1 of the 2002 Mexico/Korea BIT). 
 135. Houde, supra note 120, at 145. 
 136. See SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, SADC MODEL BIT 
WITH COMMENTARY art. 2, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ 
sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf [hereinafter 2012 SADC MODEL BIT] (“The 
definition of investment is very critical and still very controversial. Three op-
tions are included here in full . . . .”). 
 137. See, e.g., 2012 SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 136, art. 2. 
 138. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Can.-China, art. 1(1), Sept. 9, 2012, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 2014-26; 2012 
SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 136, art. 2. 
 139. See Sedelmayer v. Russ. Fed’n, Award, 65 (1998), https://www.italaw 
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0757.pdf; Gallus & Peterson, supra 
note 10, at 537–38. 
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claimant who uses those facilities can invoke the enforcement 
provisions of that convention with respect to any award they re-
ceive.140 But in the view of some ICSID tribunals, those provi-
sions are only available if the transaction at issue is an invest-
ment in an objective sense that has commerciality as a necessary 
feature,141 or in the sense that it contributes to the economic de-
velopment of the host state.142 This is not a universally ex-
pressed view, and there is an argument that the term invest-
ment is broad enough under the ICSID Convention to encompass 
some or essentially all cross-border funding by NGOs.143 A simi-
lar issue may arise if instead a claimant relies on the enforce-
ment provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York 
Convention”),144 which has sometimes been interpreted as hav-
ing a similar limitation.145 While many, perhaps most, invest-
ment treaties specify that any awards are commercial, in an ef-
fort to overcome this second hurdle regardless of the applicable 
convention, it is unclear if such specifications are sufficient in all 
instances. 
Of course, if these issues relating to the definition of invest-
ment were the only potential hurdle for claims relating to cross-
border funding of NGOs, funders and recipient domestic NGOs 
might be able to restructure their arrangements so as to make it 
easier to overcome them. For example, they might be able to do 
 
 140. See ICSID Convention, supra note 129, arts. 25(1), 54; Katharina Diel-
Gligor, Note and Comment, Competing Regimes in International Investment Ar-
bitration: Choice Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARBITRATION 677, 685–86 (2011). 
 141. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1280–82 (discussing jurisdictional cri-
teria requiring certain commercial aspects); Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, 
at 538–43 (discussing ICSID criteria for investments and tribunals’ interpreta-
tions of those criteria). 
 142. See Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003). 
But see Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux 
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 257, 272–
74 (2010) (criticizing the outcome from Salini Construttori). 
 143. See Evered, supra note 10, at 174–78 (suggesting ways in which an 
NGO can fall under ICSID convention protection); Mostajo, supra note 72, at 
35–39 (discussing ways in which NGOs meet certain jurisdictional require-
ments). See generally Mortenson, supra note 142 (urging investment tribunals 
to recognize ICSID jurisdiction over a broad range of claims). 
 144. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2577, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 
7, 1959). 
 145. Evered, supra note 10, at 176–77; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 
86, at 28. 
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so by making the transaction a loan, or otherwise structuring it 
in a way that matched a more traditional investment. 
Finally, some investment treaties may exclude certain host-
country actions from the reach of the treaty. For example, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes an ex-
ception for most tax provisions.146 The India Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty provides that the treaty does not apply to local 
government measures, tax laws, and certain other types of 
laws,147 although it is not clear whether this provision will make 
its way into many of the actual treaties entered into by India.148 
Such exclusions may both block investment treaty claims relat-
ing to restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs and provide 
a roadmap for creating restrictions that are not vulnerable to 
such claims. 
C. CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES 
Assuming an NGO providing cross-border funding to a do-
mestic NGO is able to navigate the state parties and jurisdic-
tional issues and so successfully invoke the protection of an in-
vestment treaty, and it appears this may be possible in at least 
some situations, it would of course still have to bring a cause of 
action available under the relevant investment treaty and seek 
an available remedy. Investment treaties typically provide 
causes of action for (1) failure to provide fair and equitable treat-
ment; (2) failure to provide full protection and security; (3) impo-
sition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures; (4) treatment of 
the foreign investor and its investment less favorably than a na-
tional of the host state or (assuming a most-favored-nation treat-
ment clause) a third party; (5) impeding free transfers; and (6) 
uncompensated expropriation.149 They also generally require na-
tional treatment—that is, in this context, no worse treatment for 
the foreign funder and the recipient domestic NGO than if the 
funder was a domestic one150—although that cause of action 
would not be available if the host country imposes its restrictions 
 
 146. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2103, Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 147. 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, art. 2.4. 
 148. See Priti Patnaik, Deconstructing India’s Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, WIRE (Sept. 16, 2016), https://thewire.in/66558/deconstructing-indias 
-model-bilateral-investment-treaty. 
 149. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dis-
pute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 172 (2007); Schreuer, supra note 
110, ¶¶ 48, 84. 
 150. Schreuer, supra note 110, ¶ 67. 
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equally on all funders and recipient NGOs (such as has recently 
occurred in Egypt).151 
These causes of action almost certainly apply to the types of 
restrictions on cross-border funding that have arisen in recent 
years. For example, almost all of the restrictions triggered by the 
receipt of cross-border funding—whether additional registration 
and reporting obligations, advance government approval, addi-
tional taxes or unfavorable exchange rates, required channeling 
through government channels, budget limitations, and barring 
funding for certain activities—violate the less favorably require-
ment, and may also violate both the fair and equitable treatment 
requirement and the arbitrary or discriminatory measures pro-
hibition, depending on their exact provisions and effect.152 The 
common legal restrictions placed on the foreign NGOs that pro-
vide such funding—including repeated and burdensome investi-
gation, refusal to process registration applications, criminal 
prosecution, and expulsion—raise similar issues.153 For a foreign 
NGO with a legitimate concern about the treatment of cross-bor-
der funding, establishing a cause of action should therefore be 
relatively straightforward, unless there is a treaty-specific ex-
ception that might apply.154 
With respect to remedies, it should be noted that when an 
arbitration tribunal finds a state has violated an investment 
treaty, it is unclear whether it can order a remedy other than 
monetary damages, especially as arbitration tribunals have 
tended to limit final remedies to monetary damages.155 The 
availability of other remedies, such as declaring a host country 
domestic law or administrative decision illegal or issuing an in-
junction, may depend on the language of the investment treaty 
at issue.156 For example, the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty only permits the award of monetary damages (including 
any applicable interest) or restitution of property, with the host 
 
 151. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Mostajo, supra note 72, at 47–74 (discussing the substantive pro-
tections provided under most BITs and providing examples of how NGOs can 
take advantage of those protections); ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 
10–11, 20–25 (discussing substantive protections provided by BITs and actions 
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 155. See e.g., van Aaken, supra note 96, at 734; Gallus, supra note 125, at 
90; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 25; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra 
note 86 at 25–27 . 
 156. See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 25. 
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country having the option to substitute monetary damages for 
such property.157 That model treaty’s only mention of injunctive 
relief is to permit a claimant to seek interim injunctive relief in 
a host country forum for “the sole purpose of preserving the 
claimant’s or the enterprise’s rights and interests during the 
pendency of the arbitration.”158 Similarly, the India Model Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty bars tribunals from awarding injunctive 
relief, and also from awarding punitive or moral damages.159 
Such explicit limitations on available remedies may reflect a 
trend toward more host-country-protective investment treaties, 
even on the part of developed countries such as the United 
States. Finally, as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine 
that a court enforcing an arbitration award would be likely to 
order specific performance in another country. 
Consistent with what appears to be the dominant language 
in investment treaties, tribunals appear to have almost always 
provided injunctive relief only as a provisional remedy while a 
dispute resolution is ongoing, as opposed to including injunctive 
relief in the final remedy resolving a dispute.160 (Although this 
may in part reflect the fact that investors have historically usu-
ally only sought monetary damages.161) While an NGO attempt-
ing to provide cross-border funding to a domestic NGO may in 
fact suffer damages that can be readily monetized—for example, 
if a tax is imposed on such funding or such funding is seized by 
the state—often the NGO will be more interested in obtaining 
relief that would permit it to proceed with the funding free from 
the imposition of unduly burdensome restrictions. It is far from 
clear that arbitration tribunals would be able or, even if able, 
particularly open to providing such relief, or that host countries 
would be willing to comply with tribunal decisions ordering such 
relief as opposed to monetary damages, especially since such re-
lief may be less easily enforceable against host countries in na-
tional courts.162 Finally, even if a tribunal would be willing to 
declare that a particular law should not apply to a given NGO—
and the host country agreed to follow that declaration—the case-
 
 157. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, art. 34(1). 
 158. Id. art. 26(3). 
 159. 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, arts. 26.3–.4. 
 160. See Farshad Rahimi Dizgovin, Foundations of Specific Performance in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlements: Is It Possible and Desirable?, 28 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 12–21 (2016) (discussing the use of specific performance in enforcing in-
vestment treaties); Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 28–29. 
 161. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 11. 
 162. See id at 98–100. 
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by-case nature of investment treaty arbitrations argues against 
any other NGO being able to rely on that decision, as opposed to 
having to bring its own challenge if the host country tried to ap-
ply to relevant law to it.163 While a latter claimant might be able 
to nevertheless make an estoppel argument against the host 
country, factual differences between cases may make it difficult 
to win such an argument. In other words, the best result an NGO 
likely could obtain, even if the treaty language permitted injunc-
tive relief and an arbitration tribunal was willing to provide such 
relief, would be to win what would effectively be an as-applied 
challenge to a host country law, not a facial challenge. 
* * * * * 
The above discussion reveals that international commercial 
law in the form of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties 
may provide a legally viable avenue in some situations for chal-
lenging undue burdens on cross-border funding of NGOs, but 
there are several significant legal hurdles an NGO bringing such 
a claim would have to overcome. At a minimum, those hurdles—
particularly state parties and subject matter jurisdiction con-
cerns—may foreclose a substantial proportion of potential claims 
relating to cross-border funding of NGOs. To determine how 
large that proportion likely is would require not only an empiri-
cal analysis of the agreements164 but also a mapping of that anal-
ysis against the countries imposing overly burdensome re-
strictions on the recipients or providers of such funding, a major 
task that is beyond the scope of this Article. The limitation on 
remedies may also make a significant number of otherwise via-
ble claims unattractive to the NGOs involved if provable mone-
tary damages are limited. Yet if these obstacles were the only 
ones preventing the bringing of such claims, it would be surpris-
ing that not a single such claim has been brought, given that 
these obstacles almost certainly do not block all such claims.165 
 
 163. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 164. For an approach to such analysis that could possibly be used in this 
context, see Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Uni-
verse of Investment Agreements, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 561 (2016). 
 165. The closest situation appears to have been when an NGO pursued a 
commercial investor claim for which it had received the rights. See Victor Pey 
Casado and Foundation “President Allende” v. The Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/2, Award (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw7630.pdf; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra 
note 86, at 30 (possibly discussing this case); Zymek, supra note 12, at 14 (dis-
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This is particularly true given almost 700 investment treaty 
claims were brought by commercial investors through 2015.166 
While it is possible that most NGOs involved in cross-border 
funding are simply not aware of this option, the experience of 
commercial investors suggests another reason why such NGOs 
would be unlikely to pursue such a claim even if it were legally 
viable: cost. 
III.  THE COSTS OF INVOKING INVESTMENT TREATIES   
It has been known for many years that invoking the protec-
tions of investment treaties can be expensive.167 Because of the 
relatively small number of claims and the limited public infor-
mation regarding these costs, it is only recently that the true 
magnitude of those financial costs has started to become appar-
ent, however. In addition, a claim relating to cross-border fund-
ing of NGOs might also result in reputational costs to the NGO 
bringing the claim (both with respect to the challenged host 
country and with respect to other countries where the NGO may 
work or may want to work in the future) and principle costs (to 
the extent that invoking the protections of an investment treaty 
may undermine the principles or ideals of the NGO). 
A. FINANCIAL COSTS 
The costs of invoking either (1) the ICSID facilities and 
rules; or (2) conciliation and arbitration facilities that use the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) rules—the two paths that are usually available and 
chosen by claimants invoking the protections of investment trea-
ties—have become clearer over time.168 First, a nonrefundable 
fee of $25,000 is required to begin conciliation or arbitration pro-
ceedings under the ICSID rules.169 Organizations that apply the 
 
 166. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 104. 
 167. Lee M. Caplan, Making Investor-State Arbitration More Accessible to 
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UNCITRAL rules appear to have similar or even higher initial 
fees.170 But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Conciliators, arbi-
trators, commissioners, and ad hoc committee members who 
oversee and decide the dispute have a right not only to reim-
bursement of direct expenses reasonably incurred but also to a 
fee of $3000 per day of meetings or other work performed under 
the ICSID rules.171 The UNCITRAL rules do not provide a set 
figure for such fees to be paid by the parties, but only require 
that they be reasonable and clearly stated in the final award.172 
This obligation on the parties to pay these costs is in contrast to 
most state-state international dispute mechanisms and human 
rights decisionmaking bodies, under which a state-funded insti-
tution usually compensates the decision makers.173 In addition, 
in most disputes these costs pale in comparison to the legal coun-
sel and expert costs. 
More specifically, a recent Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) study by David Gaukrodger 
and Kathryn Gordon, based on the limited publicly available 
data (many international arbitration decisions do not include 
cost information), found that on average the cost of arbitration 
between investors and states (whether under the ICSID rules, 
the UNCITRAL rules, or another system) is eight million dollars 
per dispute, with costs in some disputes exceeding thirty million 
dollars and with on average eighty-two percent of these costs be-
ing for legal counsel and experts (as opposed to for the arbitra-
tors or the institutional body involved).174 While the prevailing 
party may be able to shift some or all of its costs to the losing 
party, in many cases this shift does not occur, and whether it will 
occur in a given dispute is highly uncertain, although the trend 
may be toward a presumptive loser-pays model.175 And of course 
 
 170. See, e.g., Schedule of Fees and Costs, PERMANENT COURT ARBITRATION, 
https://www.pca-cpa.org/fees-and-costs (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (listing fees 
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the claimant could be the losing party and so face the prospect of 
not only having to bear its own costs but also some or all of the 
defending host country’s costs.176 
Not surprisingly given these high costs, the publicly availa-
ble information on the damages sought by investors indicates 
those damages range from a low of eight million dollars to a high 
of $2.5 billion.177 Claims worth less than at least several million 
dollars are likely not economically feasible.178 This is particu-
larly true given that amounts awarded as damages are usually 
significantly less than the damages claimed.179 Furthermore, the 
existence of numerous claims by for-profit investors in the 
amounts of many millions of dollars is possible given there is 
now over $1.5 trillion in foreign direct investment annually.180 
Yet, from 1987 through 2015, only slightly fewer than 700 such 
claims (under any set of international arbitration rules) are 
known to have been brought, with the bulk of such claims 
brought in the past fifteen or so years.181 The existence of an in-
ternational arbitration option almost certainly makes it easier 
for international investors to successfully resolve claims through 
host country domestic channels, which may often be less expen-
sive, as well as less likely to antagonize the host country, alt-
hough there does not appear to be any data on this effect and so 
it is impossible to determine its magnitude. 
As previously noted, the level of cross-border funding of 
NGOs is difficult to determine but appears to be a much more 
modest amount of tens of billions of dollars annually.182 The larg-
est NGO involved in cross-border funding is probably the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation (the “Gates Foundation”). In 
2015, the Gates Foundation made approximately four billion dol-
lars in grants, spread across dozens of countries and over a thou-
sand recipients (including many in the United States, where the 
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Gates Foundation is based).183 Slightly fewer than eighty of 
these grants were for ten million dollars or more, with most of 
the recipients of those grants going either to NGOs based in the 
United States, international organizations (such as the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Health Organization), or foreign government agencies (such as 
the United Arab Emirates Minster of State Office).184 Therefore 
the potential claims by even the Gates Foundation that could 
justify the cost of pursuing an international arbitration proceed-
ing are relatively few, assuming the various legal hurdles iden-
tified above to invoking the protection of an applicable invest-
ment treaty could be overcome. That said, even as large a funder 
as the Gates Foundation is not immune from the impact of re-
strictions on cross-border funding, as the Indian government re-
cently revoked the license of a Gates Foundation grantee to ac-
cept such funding.185 
Those jurisdictional and other legal hurdles also add to the 
likely cost of bringing a claim pursuant to an investment treaty, 
especially since host countries presumably will generally raise 
any viable jurisdictional concerns. Among for-profit investors 
through 2015, about a third of the approximately 440 concluded 
cases were decided in favor of the host country, about a quarter 
in favor of the investor, with the remainder either settled (usu-
ally with the terms kept confidential) or discontinued.186 In light 
of the jurisdictional uncertainties mentioned above, a lower suc-
cess rate for providers of cross-border funding to NGOs is likely. 
This is especially true given that even if an NGO providing cross-
border funding successfully overcomes those jurisdictional con-
cerns in a particular dispute, arbitration tribunal decisions are 
not precedential for any subsequent tribunal, even those apply-
ing the same investment treaty (although they often are cited by 
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later tribunals as persuasive authority).187 This lack of formal 
precedential status also lessens the attractiveness of a test case 
approach by which a group of well-resourced cross-border fun-
ders pays for the costs of a particular case with favorable facts 
in order to hopefully establish positive legal authority for later 
cases, particularly on jurisdictional issues. So even if an NGO 
providing cross-border funding has a large enough potential 
claim to justify the cost of pursuing arbitration under an invest-
ment treaty, and the resources to cover that cost, there is a sub-
stantial chance it would not be successful (and the NGO might 
even be required to cover the costs of the challenged host coun-
try). Given the lack of previous claims by NGOs and the novel 
legal issues discussed previously that such claims likely would 
raise, the magnitude of legal counsel and expert costs for such 
claims is highly uncertain and so it cannot be assumed that those 
costs would necessarily be significantly less as compared to the 
legal counsel and expert costs related to pursuing for-profit in-
vestor claims. 
The costs already discussed also do not include the costs as-
sociated with enforcing an arbitration tribunal’s monetary dam-
ages award. States that are required to pay monetary damages 
under international arbitration decisions sometimes refuse to do 
so.188 Seeking enforcement of such damages in national courts 
may also sometimes be particularly difficult for NGOs, in that 
the New York Convention and other applicable domestic laws 
may impose additional jurisdictional hurdles that could frus-
trate such attempts, especially if the host country involved is one 
of the approximately twenty-five (including China and the 
United States) that have chosen to limit the reach of the New 
York Convention to disputes arising out of commercial relation-
ships.189 And of course having to enforce a damage award only 
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further lengthens the time period for the dispute,190 which may 
have already spanned several years,191 and so further delays any 
recoupment of the costs incurred. Finally, other barriers to en-
forcement may exist, such as the application of sovereign im-
munity to protect certain state-owned assets from seizure to sat-
isfy an arbitration award.192 
In sum, the considerable financial costs involved with pur-
suing international arbitration as currently provided for in in-
vestment treaties likely renders all but a few potential claims by 
NGOs providing cross-border funding uneconomical, especially 
once the uncertainty of prevailing and the possibility of having 
to pay the defendant state’s costs are taken into account. And 
these are not the only costs that an NGO claimant may face. 
B. REPUTATIONAL COSTS 
Bringing a claim against a given host country might poison 
a given cross-border funder’s relationship with that country, 
rendering it difficult or even impossible to continue to work in 
that country even if the claim results in monetary damages for 
the funder.193 Such a result would undermine the funder’s goals 
of helping the domestic NGOs and people of the host country and 
so might not be acceptable to that funder. In addition, if a cross-
border funder is known to have brought such a claim against one 
country, other host countries might be less inclined to work with 
the funder. Particularly for NGOs that engage in activities 
where a good working relationship with host-country govern-
ments is seen as important or necessary, such reluctance could 
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be a significant additional cost.194 Bringing such a claim might 
also have negative effects on the previously supported host coun-
try domestic NGOs, including loss of domestic support and per-
secution of staff. 
The extent of such reputational costs is speculative at this 
point, however. There do not appear to be any studies consider-
ing whether and to what extent for-profit investors pursuing 
claims under investment treaties have suffered reputational 
damage that prevented them from pursuing future investment 
opportunities, either in the defendant host country or in host 
countries generally. The studies of reputational effects of such 
claims tend to focus instead on the reputation of the host-country 
governments with respect to meeting their treaty obligations.195 
And of course such information may not be indicative of the po-
tential reputational damage to NGOs, given the different nature 
of their investments in the host countries. It is therefore highly 
uncertain what effect, if any, bringing such claims might have 
on the ability of an NGO to operate in the defendant host country 
in the future, or in other countries. Of course, that very uncer-
tainty is another reason why providers of cross-border funding 
to NGOs may be reluctant to try to invoke the protections of in-
ternational investment treaties to counter restrictions on such 
funding. 
C. PRINCIPLES COSTS 
Some NGOs that engage in significant amounts of cross-bor-
der activity are also critical of current international commercial 
law and particularly the growing web of investment treaties.196 
For example, the Transnational Institute is highly critical of in-
vestment treaties, viewing them as favoring the financial inter-
ests of large corporations over host country sovereignty and re-
sulting in negative social and ecological impacts.197 While less 
 
 194. Evered, supra note 10, at 160–62 (discussing the importance of reaching 
agreement between the NGOs and host countries). 
 195. See, e.g., Shahryar Minhas & Karen Remmer, Contingent Institutions: 
The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes (Mar. 5, 2015), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576568 (exploring the extent to which 
alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputations). 
 196. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 547; Mostajo, supra note 72, at 77–
78. 
 197. NICK BUXTON ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (TNI) & CORPORATE 
EUROPE OBSERVATORY (CEO), LEGALISED PROFITEERING? HOW CORPORATE 
LAWYERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2011), https:// 
www.tni.org/en/briefing/legalised-profiteering. 
 2018] CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING 1247 
 
overtly critical, the Ford Foundation has also supported efforts 
to reform international commercial law through its Reforming 
Global Financial Governance initiative.198 NGOs with this per-
spective may be reluctant to invoke the protections provided by 
the very system they criticize, as doing so might undermine their 
other efforts and alienate some of their staff and supporters. It 
is not clear, however, how many NGOs engaged in cross-border 
funding have such concerns. 
* * * * * 
Based on the experience of for-profit investors that have 
brought claims under investment treaties, it is likely that the 
financial costs faced by an NGO seeking to challenge a host coun-
try’s treatment of its cross-border funding activities or recipients 
would render all or almost all such claims economically unwise. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the significant, although not nec-
essarily insurmountable, jurisdictional hurdles such an NGO 
would need to clear, which could both doom the NGO’s claim and 
possibly expose it to liability for the costs incurred by the defend-
ant host-country government. The likely lack of both injunctive 
relief and definite lack of precedential value for any arbitration 
decision further reduce the attractiveness to an NGO of bringing 
such a claim. While the potential reputational costs of pursuing 
such a claim are much less certain, they also weigh against 
bringing such a claim, as do the principles costs for those NGOs 
that are critical of the international investment treaty structure. 
Two commentators have argued that even the threat of an 
investment treaty claim may be sufficient to alter host country 
behavior and so blunt some of growing legal restrictions on cross-
border funding without the need to incur the costs of actually 
bringing such a claim.199 It may be that the availability of invest-
ment treaty claim mechanisms for for-profit investors has influ-
enced investor-state relations generally and encouraged resolu-
tion of many disputes before the filing of a formal claim for 
arbitration, even though a relatively small proportion of foreign 
direct investments have been the subject of actual claims.200 But 
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it likely was necessary for some successful claims to be made be-
fore most host countries took their investment treaty obligations 
seriously. Absent any claims by NGOs relating to cross-border 
funding—much less successful claims—host countries could, and 
likely would, accurately judge that a threat to bring such a claim 
is a hollow one. Furthermore, even if it could be demonstrated 
that such claims can be viable, the relatively small amounts of 
damages available would also limit the effect of potential expo-
sure to such claims on host country behavior. Finally, and as will 
be discussed further in the next Part, at least at this time, it ap-
pears that host countries perceive a much lower national need 
for such funding (as opposed to foreign direct investment) and so 
are likely to be less concerned about developing a reputation for 
being hostile to such funding or otherwise discouraging such 
funding. 
Does this mean NGOs facing the growing legal restrictions 
on cross-border funding have no viable international law remedy 
to challenge such restrictions? The answer is currently yes, but 
there may be ways to modify the existing international-invest-
ment protection legal regime to better accommodate claims by 
such NGOs. It may also be possible to develop a separate inter-
national treaty framework to better protect such funding, con-
sistent with the international law. The next Part addresses these 
possibilities. 
IV.  REVISITING THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES   
There are at least two ways the existing legal regime could 
be modified to increase the ability of NGOs providing cross-bor-
der funding to successfully access a formal international law re-
gime to challenge unduly burdensome legal restrictions on such 
funding. One way would be either to fund, or to significantly re-
duce the financial costs associated with, invoking the protections 
of existing investment treaties. This way is relatively feasible, in 
that it would not require the creation of new treaties and could 
be incorporated into already existing efforts to address the costs 
of international arbitration generally. The other way would be to 
try to create a distinct protection regime for such funding by 
identifying the reasons for the relatively recent surge in invest-
ment treaties and trying to generate similar momentum for new 
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agreements addressing cross-border funding of NGOs. This sec-
ond way would be much more difficult to pursue and would al-
most certainly require a much longer time frame to implement, 
but potentially could provide more certain and comprehensive 
protection for such funding. 
A. REDUCING THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVOKING INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 
Since the magnitude of reputational costs is uncertain and 
may be minimal in some, if not many, instances, and since prin-
ciples costs only probably apply to a relatively small portion of 
the NGOs providing cross-border funding, it makes sense to fo-
cus primarily on reducing the financial costs that most clearly 
pose a barrier to NGOs seeking to invoke the protections of in-
vestment treaties. There are a number of existing proposals for 
addressing the costs of arbitration under investment treaties 
generally that could help achieve this goal, including making 
resolution of disputes more cost effective, facilitating third-party 
financing of claims, and increasing the amount and certainty of 
cost-shifting to the losing party,201 although the openness of host 
countries to these changes is uncertain (at least to the extent 
they may make it easier to bring claims against them). There 
also are several possible ways to reduce these costs specifically 
for NGOs seeking to challenge restrictions on their cross-border 
funding activities, including permitting or requiring fee waivers 
and encouraging pro bono legal and expert assistance. 
1. Addressing the Costs of International Arbitration Generally 
Turning first to the more general proposals, ICSID has al-
ready taken a number of steps to streamline its procedures and 
so hopefully lower the financial costs of the parties invoking 
those procedures, although it is not yet clear whether those steps 
have actually reduced those costs.202 Of course, cost reduction in 
the form of a more efficient process risks reducing the quality of 
the dispute resolution, although it is also not clear whether this 
has occurred.203 In addition, various commentators have sug-
gested further ways to prevent disputes or manage them more 
effectively, which could not only reduce financial costs but also 
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might reduce reputational costs by putting less strain on inves-
tor-state relations.204 These further ways tend to involve either 
(1) host countries setting up institutions or procedures to better 
identify and resolve potential disputes before they rise to the 
level of formal claim and to better educate relevant government 
officials; or (2) host countries and aggrieved investors pursuing 
nonbinding alternate dispute resolution processes to more 
quickly and cheaply resolve disputes that do arise.205 But, as Mi-
chael Reisman has suggested with respect to why a significant 
number of disputes are probably already resolved before a notice 
of arbitration is submitted, these options likely will only be ef-
fective if backstopped by the credible threat of compulsory arbi-
tration.206 It is therefore necessary to not simply reduce the cost 
of resolving disputes more generally as most of these suggestions 
seek to do, but to also significantly reduce the cost of actual ar-
bitration for NGOs so as make the threat of such arbitration 
credible for NGOs engaged in cross-border funding. 
A potentially more promising way of helping NGOs cover the 
costs of arbitration would be for them to tap into the growing 
availability of third-party financing for commercial litigation, in-
cluding in the international investment context.207 Interestingly, 
in at least two cases NGOs have served as third-party funders 
for international investment claims that were of interest to those 
NGOs.208 One case involved a 2010 claim by Philip Morris 
against Uruguay, where the U.S.-based Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids provided funding for Uruguay’s successful defense.209 
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The other case involved a successful 2003 set of claims pursued 
by a group of dispossessed Zimbabwean farmers, which was par-
tially funded by the U.K.-based AgricAfrica.210 While this role 
indicates that pursuing a claim in international arbitration is 
not beyond the financial reach of all NGOs, it is notable that 
these NGOs enjoyed financial support from Bloomberg Philan-
thropies and the Open Society Initiative of South Africa, respec-
tively, which in turn are supported by the deep pockets of billion-
aires Michael Bloomberg and George Soros.211 
Third-party financing in this context raises a variety of con-
cerns, including possible conflicts between the provider of financ-
ing and the NGO regarding the appropriate resolution of the dis-
pute, whether such financing should be disclosed to the 
arbitrators, and whether such financers can be subject to cost 
shifting.212 In the context of an NGO claim, perhaps the most 
pressing concerns are that the involvement of such a financier 
would tilt the scales toward seeking pecuniary damages as op-
posed to nonpecuniary remedies that otherwise the NGO would 
prefer (if they are available) and, relatedly, whether the same 
calculus that makes pursuing such claims uneconomical for most 
NGOs because of the modest level of any monetary damages 
available would also make such claims unattractive to most fi-
nanciers. Because of these concerns, an NGO likely would have 
to identify a financier motivated at least in part by political or 
ideological reasons in order to obtain such financing (as was the 
 
note 208; Mac Margolis, Big Tobacco Gets Crushed by Tiny Uruguay, BLOOM-
BERG VIEW (July 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07 
-18/big-tobacco-gets-crushed-by-tiny-uruguay. 
 210. See Funnekotter et al. v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, 
Award, ¶¶ 1, 148 (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case 
-documents/ita0349.pdf; Alan Beattie & Luke Peterson, Farmers Use Tribunal 
To Tackle Harare, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at 10; Augustine Mukaro, Dutch 
Farmers Put Zim Land Reform on Trial, ZIMBABWE INDEP. (July 1, 2005), 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/07/01/dutch-farmers-put-zim-land 
-reform-on-trial; Peterson, supra note 208; Damon Vis-Dunbar, Tribunal Orders 
Compensation in Dutch Farmers’ Claims Against Zimbabwe, INV. TREATY NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/04/28/tribunal-orders 
-compensation-in-dutch-farmers-claims-against-zimbabwe. 
 211. See Wyre Davies, Michael Bloomberg Fights Big Tobacco in Uruguay, 
BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america 
-32199250; Peterson, supra note 208; Statement by Michael R. Bloomberg on 
Philip Morris International v. Uruguay Decision (July 8, 2016), https://www 
.mikebloomberg.com/news/statement-by-michael-r-bloomberg-on-philip-morris 
-international-v-uruguay-decision. 
 212. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 39–42. 
 1252 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1205 
 
case in the two known instances where an NGO served as a 
third-party financier).213 
A variation on this approach would be for a group of simi-
larly situated NGOs operating in the same country to pool their 
resources to fund a single claim by one of their members. Such 
an approach has the advantage of possibly avoiding disagree-
ments over the remedies to pursue, although conflicts on this 
point and other aspects of the claim might still arise between the 
NGOs provided the funding. There are, however, significant bar-
riers to this test case approach as noted previously, including 
that the claim would not create a binding precedent, even if suc-
cessful, and the fact that the financial resources needed to pur-
sue a given claim may be beyond the reach of even a relatively 
large group of NGOs.214 (For similar reasons establishing some 
type of captive insurance arrangement to fund such claims would 
also be difficult.) 
Lastly, clarifying the rules regarding cost-shifting based on 
the final resolution of a dispute would reduce some of the uncer-
tainty regarding both whether a prevailing claimant will have to 
bear its own costs and whether a losing claimant faces a signifi-
cant risk of bearing the costs of the defendant host country.215 
However, there is still substantial uncertainty regarding the 
likelihood of prevailing, especially in the NGO context, particu-
larly given the jurisdictional issues discussed previously, as well 
as the burden of bearing the financial costs while the dispute is 
being resolved even if there is a strong prospect of recovering 
those costs if the NGO prevails. So such clarification likely would 
not significantly reduce the possible financial costs to an NGO 
as long as the jurisdictional uncertainties are still significant. 
Furthermore, any clarification in the direction of increased fee-
shifting could increase the possible costs, given the uncertain 
success of any cross-border funding of NGOs claim. Finally, if 
much of the costs are waived or eliminated through pro bono as-
sistance, there would be limited costs available for shifting even 
in the event of a successful claim. 
 
 213. See supra notes 208–11 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 215. Franck, supra note 175, at 844; Smith, supra note 175, at 750. 
 2018] CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING 1253 
 
2. Addressing the Costs of International Arbitration for NGOs 
There may be, however, ways to reduce the costs of interna-
tional arbitration specifically for NGOs that could be more effec-
tive.216 One way would be for the ICSID to waive its initial 
$25,000 fee and to encourage arbitrators and others paid pursu-
ant to ICSID’s fee schedules to either waive their fees or to accept 
significantly reduced fees because of the nature of the claimant. 
Such a change would not require amendment of the numerous 
existing investment treaties, but could be made instead by IC-
SID and thus applicable to all arbitrations under its rules. More 
specifically, the current fee structure exists under ICSID Admin-
istrative and Financial Regulations 14 and 16, which grant the 
ICSID Secretary-General the authority to set the fees.217 With 
respect to the fee rate for arbitrators and other members of deci-
sion-making bodies, the approval of the President of the World 
Bank, in their role as the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council, would also be needed.218 It is not clear, however, 
whether this authority extends to setting different fee rates 
based on the nature of the claimant or whether instead the IC-
SID Administrative Council would need to modify the applicable 
Administrative and Financial Regulations (pursuant to ICSID 
Convention Article 6(1)(a)).219 There is also the related issue of 
whether the fees should also be adjusted for the defendant host 
countries when a claim is brought by an NGO, particularly since 
their fees could be shifted to the NGO if the defendant host coun-
try prevails. 
Because the UNCITRAL Rules and other commonly used ar-
bitration rules do not specify a fee structure (beyond limiting fees 
to those that are reasonable) and are administered by a number 
of organizations, it would be more difficult to seek such financial 
accommodations for arbitrations bought by NGOs under those 
other sets of rules.220 This is a concern in part because of the 
possible additional jurisdictional hurdle under the ICSID rules 
 
 216. These proposals mirror in part suggestions by others concerned with 
access to international arbitration in this context for parties with limited finan-
cial resources. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 167, at 307–10 (discussing small and 
medium-sized enterprises). 
 217. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (ICSID), Administrative and 
Financial Regulations, in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 60–
62, regs. 14(1), 16 (2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ 
2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf. 
 218. See id. at 60, reg. 14(1); ICSID Convention, supra note 129, art. 5. 
 219. See ICSID Convention, supra note 129, art. 6(1)(a). 
 220. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 1254 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1205 
 
mentioned previously that does not appear to be present under 
other sets of rules, and so NGOs might prefer these other sets of 
rules, when available.221 Such accommodation could neverthe-
less be sought by approaching the various private bodies that 
offer (for a fee) to appoint arbitrators and provide administrative 
services in order to resolve international investor disputes pur-
suant to these rules. 
Finally, ICSID and other arbitration facilities may be un-
willing to grant such waivers even if it would be possible to do 
so, both because it could make them appear biased toward one 
party and because it would open the door for waiver requests 
from other financially strapped parties, such as small and me-
dium-sized enterprises and less developed countries. 
As noted previously, on average the bulk of costs for arbitra-
tion of for-profit investor disputes do not stem from the fees 
charged by the bodies that facilitate arbitration and the costs of 
the arbitrators themselves; rather the vast majority of such costs 
represent the legal and expert fees charged by the individuals 
and firms that assist the parties to such arbitrations.222 Any at-
tempt to significantly reduce those costs must therefore also take 
these legal and expert fees into account. One NGO-specific op-
tion for doing so would be to encourage law firms and experts 
engaged in these disputes to grant their services on a pro bono 
basis to the NGO, which may be particularly attractive if they 
support the NGO’s goals or are troubled by the legal restrictions 
on cross-border funding that the NGO is challenging. Given the 
relative size and expertise of the legal and expert community for 
international commercial arbitrations—dozens of major law 
firms now have international arbitration practices—it should be 
possible to match at least some potential NGO claimants with 
favorably inclined lawyers and experts.223 Such pro bono service 
may be particularly attractive as a counter to accusations that 
these lawyers and experts are enriching themselves to the detri-
ment of host countries.224 Such service also is in step with the 
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growing calls for all lawyers to provide pro bono services, partic-
ularly by the courts in New York where many of these practices 
are based.225 
There likely would, however, be some significant obstacles 
to this pro bono approach. First, taking on one or more such 
claims could create potential conflicts of interest that could pre-
vent the lawyers and experts involved from taking on other, pay-
ing clients (including any host countries involved). Second, even 
if no technical conflicts of interest arose, lawyers and experts 
might be hesitant to get involved in NGO disputes on a pro bono 
basis because by doing so they may risk both alienating the po-
tential host country or for-profit investor clients and opening the 
door to requests from some of those clients for reduced or waived 
fees. Third, given the many complex legal issues relating to such 
disputes, there likely would be many hours of work required. Fi-
nally, the increasing financial demands placed on law firms, as 
well as the likely sensitivity of willingness to provide pro bono 
assistance to the changing economic fortunes of such firms, may 
more than outweigh the pressure from the increasing calls for 
lawyers to provide additional pro bono services. 
Even with these caveats, the NGO-specific proposals appear 
to have more promise, as compared to the more general cost 
strategies, to significantly reduce the cost barrier for an NGO to 
pursue a challenge to burdensome legal restrictions on cross-bor-
der funding under an investment treaty. Pursuing these pro-
posals would still require significant effort, however, both to gen-
erate a cadre of pro bono lawyers and experts in a legal space 
where such a group has not existed before and to persuade IC-
SID and other arbitration facilities to waive or reduce their fees 
in this context. An NGO pursuing such a claim would also likely 
have to cover some costs, even if it received most services on a 
pro bono basis, such as travel expenses for the arbitrators, law-
yers, and any experts involved, and so would need to have or se-
cure the financial resources to do so. And, of course, this ap-
proach assumes that the jurisdictional hurdles discussed 
previously are surmountable, at least under many, if not most, 
investment treaties, and the potential monetary damages are 
significant enough to make the effort worthwhile even with re-
duced costs. Finally, using investment treaties in this fashion 
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could lead to host country responses that could limit or neutral-
ize any protections obtained for cross-border funding of NGOs, 
including pursuit of other means of restricting such funding (or 
domestic NGOs more generally) that are less likely to fall under 
such treaties and even renegotiation of those treaties to explic-
itly exclude such funding from protection. 
It is therefore far from clear that existing investment trea-
ties would be sufficient to counter the increasing restrictions on 
cross-border funding for NGOs, even if the cost concerns identi-
fied here could be overcome. It is therefore necessary to consider 
a more ambitious option in case using existing investment trea-
ties to protect cross-border funding of NGOs proves not to be fea-
sible. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR CREATING A DISTINCT PROTECTION REGIME 
FOR CROSS-BORDER FUNDING OF NGOS 
It was far from a given that the growing web of investment 
treaties would come into existence, and indeed the magnitude of 
its growth has been characterized as both “radical”226 and “re-
markable.”227 This is in part because, unlike previous interna-
tional commercial treaties and early bilateral investment trea-
ties, more recent investment treaties generally give investors—
not just the state parties to the treaties—the right to bring 
claims against a state party pursuant to compulsory arbitration 
without the involvement of the investor’s home-country govern-
ment and without the necessity of exhausting domestic reme-
dies.228 This was a significant change, because by providing an 
effective way for investors to directly resolve disputes through 
international arbitration with host countries, these treaties re-
moved the need for investors to either have their claims placed 
on the diplomatic agendas of the countries involved or to exhaust 
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host country domestic court remedies.229 The ability to avoid go-
ing to domestic courts is particularly attractive to investors, be-
cause they tended to view such courts as not being impartial, as 
being bound by domestic laws that disfavored foreign investors, 
and as often lacking the technical expertise required to resolve 
complex investment disputes.230 This change was particularly 
striking because it was only possible with the consent of the 
states involved, usually obtained on a bilateral basis, although 
some multilateral investment treaties now exist.231 
Could the factors that led to many states entering into such 
agreements, despite initial hostility because of the loss of sover-
eignty they represented, have parallels in the context of cross-
border funding of NGOs, such that similar momentum could be 
created for a distinct and accessible set of legal protections for 
such funding under bilateral and multilateral treaties? To con-
sider such a possibility first requires a general understanding of 
how the existing web of investment treaties came into existence. 
1. Key Factors Supporting Creation of Investment Treaties 
While many factors played into the positive shift in attitude 
of most, although not all, countries toward investment treaties, 
consideration of the history of international law relating to for-
eign direct investment reveals two critical examples that came 
together in the late twentieth century to begin, and then main-
tain, the surge in modern investment treaties. Those critical fac-
tors are host country demand and investor demand, with the lat-
ter stemming in large part from the perceived inadequacy of 
other approaches for protecting foreign direct investment and 
the viability of the international arbitration approach to dispute 
resolution that is now incorporated in almost all investment 
treaties.232 
Host Country Demand: A combination of the collapse of com-
munism as an ideological force, the economic successes of Asian 
developing countries that embraced a capitalist model, and a 
growing view in developing countries that strong economic de-
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velopment requires foreign direct investment led many develop-
ing-country governments to pursue investment treaties in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, albeit with some reserva-
tions.233 For example, beginning in the 1980s even Latin Ameri-
can states that had been the most steadfast in their opposition 
to developing country views relating to protecting foreign invest-
ments, began entering into BITs and acceding to the ICSID Con-
vention, although more recently they have been expressing some 
reservations regarding international arbitration.234 This shift in 
views was also driven in part during the 1980s by the interna-
tional debt crisis and the reduced availability of financial aid 
from developed country governments, thereby increasing compe-
tition for the remaining significant source of foreign capital: for-
eign direct investment.235 While not all commentators agree 
with this explanation, there is general agreement that individ-
ual host countries felt pressure to compete with each other in 
agreeing to protections for foreign direct investments, even 
though collectively they resisted efforts to impose such protec-
tions on a multilateral basis.236 This pressure may have arisen 
in part by an impression that home countries would treat host 
countries and their economic interests, including exports, more 
favorably if an investment treaty was in place.237 The ground-
work for this demand was also arguably laid by the wholesale 
unwinding of many previous foreign investments, made under 
colonial and pre-communist governments, through mass expro-
priations in the post–World War II era (especially relating to 
control of natural resources) and the subsequent diplomatic res-
olution of claims arising out of those expropriations.238 
Investor Demand: At the same time, the increasing globali-
zation of business activities and interests in the second half of 
the twentieth century led to increasing demands by investors 
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that their home countries enter into investment treaties that 
protect their foreign investments, especially in the wake of mass 
expropriations earlier in the twentieth century.239 For example, 
in the 1970s lobbying by the business community in the United 
States led to the launch by the U.S. government of its BIT pro-
gram in 1977.240 More recently, investors in developing countries 
have begun to make significant foreign investments, leading to 
an increasing number of BITs between developing countries, as 
opposed to BITs that follow the previously dominant pattern of 
being between developed and developing countries.241 These 
pressures may have not only made home countries agreeable to 
entering into investment treaties, but also may have led to those 
countries conditioning other benefits to host countries, such as 
government aid or loans from multilateral development institu-
tions, on having an acceptable investment treaty in place.242 
This investor demand was driven by the fact that in the 
years prior to the growth in modern investment treaties existing 
international law was generally seen as inadequate to protect 
foreign direct investments.243 This perception arose in large part 
because of sharply divergent views between developed and de-
veloping countries regarding the appropriate level of protection 
for such investments under customary international law, as ex-
emplified by the U.N. Declaration of the New International Eco-
nomic Order and the U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties of States in the 1970s, as well as earlier disputes between 
these two types of countries.244 Attempts to develop a broad mul-
tilateral agreement to protect such investments also foundered 
on these differences despite repeated attempts.245 At the same 
time, the nineteenth century’s diplomatic-protection approach, 
which relied on the use of not only diplomatic pressure but also 
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military force to protect the property of investors in foreign coun-
tries, became less useful—both because of the necessity of home 
country involvement that was tempered by other national con-
cerns and the growing rejection of using military force for such 
purposes.246 Finally, other means of protecting foreign direct in-
vestment, including host country domestic laws and investment 
contracts, were not seen as sufficient by investors.247 
At the same time, international arbitration began to gain a 
reputation as a successful way to resolve investor-state disputes, 
particularly through the oil concession agreement cases and the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s decisions; international arbitra-
tion’s development was further aided by treaties, such as the 
1958 New York Convention and the 1965 ICSID Convention, 
that facilitated such arbitration and ensured the ability of pre-
vailing investors to enforce arbitration results in national 
courts.248 The fact that these treaties established procedural 
rules and gave binding effect to arbitration results without hav-
ing to resolve the long-standing dispute over the appropriate 
level of protection for foreign direct investments as against host-
country governments made this approach more feasible than a 
broad multilateral agreement incorporating such substantive 
standards. 
It is important to note that this history is measured in dec-
ades and so reflects much broader political and economic devel-
opments across that time period, including the emergence of 
many countries from colonial rule and the end of the Cold War, 
with the collapse of communism.249 It is also important to note 
that the current investment-treaties web is not without its crit-
ics, not only with respect to some of the details of those treaties 
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but also with respect to whether those treaties in fact have in-
creased the level of foreign direct investment,250 or unduly favor 
developed-world business interests over the interests of host 
country populations.251 For this reason, many countries and in-
ternational organizations are actively considering how the exist-
ing global international-investment-agreement regime should be 
reformed, and a small number of countries have chosen to termi-
nate existing investment treaties.252 Not coincidentally and as 
noted previously, the growth in such treaties has slowed.253 Nev-
ertheless, the large and still growing number of such treaties 
demonstrates their now established and important role in inter-
national commercial law.254 
2. Key Factors Supporting Creation of Cross-Border Funding 
Protection 
Do similar factors potentially exist in the context of cross-
border funding of NGOs? If so, could they generate sufficient mo-
mentum to create viable formal legal dispute mechanisms to pro-
tect such funding? And what form should such mechanisms 
take? For example, should they be incorporated into existing and 
new investment treaties, other existing agreements such as re-
gional human rights treaties, or new bilateral and multilateral 
agreements? At the risk of over-generalizing, given the enor-
mous variety of host countries and NGOs, it is possible to give 
some initial thought to these questions. 
Host Country Demand: The spread of burdensome legal re-
strictions on cross-border funding of NGOs indicates that many 
host-country governments see little domestic demand or na-
tional need to agree to a formal legal regime that would allow for 
challenges to such restrictions. As Oonagh Breen has detailed, 
such governments tend to base such restrictions on the concept 
of “host country ownership” of both development and political 
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agendas, an assertion of sovereignty that has much in common 
with historical developing country objections, based on the su-
premacy of host country domestic law, to developed country 
views of required foreign investment protections.255 While eco-
nomic realities, shifting views regarding the benefits of markets, 
and competition among host countries for foreign direct invest-
ment eventually overcame those objections in most host coun-
tries with respect to foreign investments, there do not appear to 
be similar forces emerging that would overcome these views in 
the context of cross-border funding of NGOs. As Moore and 
Rutzen have acknowledged, securing political will for a treaty to 
help promote global philanthropy, including protections for 
cross-border funding, would “be a formidable challenge.”256 This 
is almost certainly an understatement, even though some host 
countries have joined voluntary, nonbinding international ef-
forts that include a commitment to protecting the ability of 
NGOs to operate in ways consistent with freedom of association, 
such as the Open Government Partnership, which currently has 
seventy-five participating countries, and the Community of De-
mocracies.257 Furthermore, the current skepticism in some cir-
cles regarding the positive effects of BITs and other treaties, as 
evidenced not only by the reconsideration of existing investment 
treaties in some countries but also the decision by the United 
States to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, does not bode 
well for the prospects of creating a new international treaty re-
gime relating to NGOs.258 
One possible way to address this lack of host country de-
mand would be to gather data regarding the positive effects of 
such funding on initiatives that tend to be important to host 
countries, such as disaster relief and development assistance. 
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This effort could take advantage of both the growing systematic 
consideration of development aid and the increasing profile of 
such aid given the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and 
other similar international efforts.259 Some such efforts are al-
ready underway, but gathering these data will be costly and time 
consuming, with no guarantee that the results would make a 
strong enough case to convince many host countries to surrender 
some of their control over the legal rules governing cross-border 
funding of domestic NGOs (especially at a time when some of 
those countries are questioning the wisdom of their investment 
treaty commitments).260 There also do not appear to be any ob-
vious parallels to the “Asian tigers” that so strongly made the 
case for economic liberalism.261 
Cross-Border Funder Demand: On the surface, there ap-
pears to be significant interest among cross-border funders in 
such protections (if they are affordable), given the relatively high 
profile that the lack of such protections has recently attained in 
media reports and elsewhere. In 2015, however, Carothers ob-
served that many such funders have only begun to consider how 
to address the increasing legal restrictions on such funding and 
collectively their overall response “is still not very strong.”262 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many funders were at that point only 
focused on working out their specific problems with particular 
governments and not broader policy responses.263 He also noted 
that divisions within the funding community have weakened its 
ability to respond and to coalesce around any given approach.264 
This appears to still be the case, even though there have been 
some attempts at creating a unified voice, such as The Civic 
Space Initiative sponsored by four international NGOs con-
cerned about this issue and, beginning in 2017, the Funders’ In-
itiative for Civil Society.265 Absent a relatively strong and uni-
fied voice on this issue, it seems unlikely that the home countries 
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for cross-border funders will be particularly inclined to make ne-
gotiating such protections with host countries a high or even sig-
nificant diplomatic priority. One necessary step for pursuing this 
approach will therefore be to continue to increase the communi-
cation with and among funders regarding these increasing re-
strictions and possible responses, in order to develop that voice. 
Whether such communication would be sufficient to overcome 
the tendency of funders to focus on their particular situations 
and the collective action difficulties in developing such a voice 
remains to be seen, however.266 
If cross-border funders can speak with a sufficiently unified 
voice, as investors did when pushing for investment treaties, 
they may also be able to successfully argue that the desired pro-
tections are in the long-run self-interest of their home countries. 
In this context, that self-interest is not primarily economic, but 
instead is about ensuring stability in host countries and thus re-
ducing risks of creating unstable or failed states, and the poten-
tial dangers to other countries that can result from such 
states.267 Convincing home countries that restrictions on cross-
border funding of NGOs (and other restrictions on host-country 
NGOs) is not only a human rights and democracy issue but also 
a national security issue will not necessarily be an easy or quick 
task, however, especially given antiterrorism concerns that host 
countries often use to justify such restrictions.268 
It also has not yet been demonstrated that the time and ef-
fort required to lay the groundwork for new international agree-
ments is necessary to sufficiently protect cross-border funding of 
NGOs. For the reasons already discussed, it appears existing in-
ternational law does not provide a sufficiently robust legal re-
gime for successfully challenging legal restrictions on such fund-
ing.269 What is less clear is if the workarounds that many 
funders have pursued to address such restrictions are inade-
quate to protect most such funding and whether domestic and 
international campaigns to influence the lawmakers in host 
countries will be inadequate as well.270 While in some countries 
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that have been the most aggressive in their efforts, such as 
Egypt, these alternative measures appear to have been insuffi-
cient, it is uncertain how widespread that lack of effectiveness 
is.271 The fact that most of these workaround efforts are of recent 
vintage (and public information regarding them is limited) hin-
ders any such evaluation. It does appear to be too early, however, 
to write off these alternative approaches in favor of what would 
almost certainly be a complex and therefore costly and time-con-
suming pursuit of new international agreements that could very 
well not succeed. As noted previously, it took several decades for 
it to become clear that other means of protecting investments, 
including negotiating a broad multilateral agreement, were not 
viable.272 
Finally, consideration has to be given to whether creating 
agreements that parallel the existing investment treaty struc-
ture, including using international arbitration as the formal le-
gal dispute mechanism, is a viable one in the cross-border fund-
ing of NGOs context. For the cost reasons previously discussed, 
international arbitration may not be a practical option in this 
context, especially if the strategies discussed above to address 
these costs are found to not be feasible.273 A mechanism that in-
stead relies on member state, not party, funding may then be a 
better option. This consideration would also need to include what 
is the best vehicle for such agreements—for example, existing 
investment treaties, existing regional human rights agreements 
(with their existing dispute resolution mechanisms), or new, 
stand-alone bilateral or multilateral treaties. With respect to the 
second option, there is currently pending a case brought by 
eleven Russian NGOs challenging restrictions on cross-border 
funding of NGOs under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Ecodefense, Golos, and Other NGOs v. Russia).274 That 
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case may provide a good test regarding whether the existing pro-
visions of this regional human rights agreement are sufficient to 
successfully challenge such restrictions and therefore whether 
they are a viable protection with respect to the countries that are 
part of this agreements; if they prove to be, expanding the reach 
of such treaties may be the best way to protect cross-border fund-
ing of NGOs. 
* * * * * 
The relative success of international commercial law, partic-
ularly investment treaties, when it comes to protecting foreign 
investments may be difficult to translate to the cross-border 
funding of NGOs context. Even given that many existing invest-
ment treaties may apply to such funding, that application is not 
without doubt; the current financial costs of invoking that pro-
tection are too high for all but the wealthiest NGOs; and reputa-
tional and principles costs may further limit or even effectively 
eliminate NGO access to those protections. There may, however, 
be ways to address those costs for NGOs by urging arbitration 
institutions, lawyers, and experts to waive or sharply reduce 
their fees for claims brought by such entities, or by seeking third 
party financing. Whether the successful pursuit of some such 
claims would lead to improved behavior on the part of host coun-
tries or instead a backlash that would generate new restrictions 
or narrowed treaty provisions is unclear, however. 
As for instead pursuing new agreements to protect cross-
border funding by NGOs, the history of investment treaties indi-
cates that a confluence of factors is needed to make doing so pos-
sible by generating sufficient host country demand (or at least 
grudging acceptance of the need for such protections) and suffi-
cient cross-border funder demand driven by a lack of adequate 
other options. While it has been at least a decade since observers 
began highlighting these restrictions, the momentum for the 
current investment treaties took several decades to grow, and it 
seems likely that would be the case in the cross-border funding 
of NGOs context as well. This time is necessary because of the 
need to develop a case for protecting such funding that would be 
persuasive to host countries, the lack of a current consensus 
among funders regarding how to proceed, the need to determine 
whether less costly and time-consuming alternatives exist, and 
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the need to determine what approach holds the most promise for 
resolving funder-state disputes in conformity with international 
law. It may also be necessary to wait for the current rise in na-
tionalist sentiments and related general hostility to interna-
tional agreements to wane. In other words, much work remains 
to be done and a significant amount of time may need to pass 
before the best approach for combatting these restrictions can be 
determined and sufficient support for that approach generated 
if using existing investment treaties is not feasible. 
In the meantime, and particularly if invoking the protec-
tions of international investment treaties proves impractical be-
cause of the obstacles to doing so, both the recipients and provid-
ers of cross-border funding for NGOs will need to consider 
alternate approaches to countering the growing restrictions on 
such funding. The final part of this Article addresses those alter-
nate approaches. 
V.  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING 
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER FUNDING   
It is possible that given enough time and resources, NGOs 
facing undue restrictions on their ability to provide and receive 
cross-border funding will be able to successfully challenge those 
restrictions either under existing investment treaties or under 
new agreements specifically designed to protect such funding 
and perhaps NGOs more generally. But that is little comfort to 
NGOs that currently face such restrictions and the prospect that 
those restrictions may cause decades of work to be squandered 
or thousands of people to be denied needed assistance. Such 
NGOs therefore need to instead consider a variety of ad hoc ap-
proaches and to carefully choose the ones that best fit the specific 
country and type of restriction they face, some of which were 
mentioned previously.275 In the interests of brevity a full consid-
eration of such approaches has to be deferred to a later day, but 
some initial consideration can be given here. 
One approach is to try to stop such restrictions before they 
even become law, or to fight for their repeal if they are already 
in place. For example, the International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law (ICNL) and other NGOs successfully worked together in 
Kyrgyzstan to convince the parliament there in 2016 to reject a 
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foreign agents law targeting NGOs that mirrored the existing 
Russian law discussed previously.276 ICNL and other interna-
tional NGOs are usually critical to such efforts, both for identi-
fying legislation of concern in a timely fashion and for providing 
resources and needed coordination for opposition efforts.277 
If attempts to stop such restrictions are unsuccessful or the 
restrictions of concern are already in place, another possible ap-
proach is to challenge the application of such restrictions under 
host country domestic law instead of under international law. 
For example, Greenpeace in 2015 successfully challenged the ap-
plication of India’s restrictions on cross-border funding in the In-
dian courts.278 The success of such an approach will of course 
depend on the strength of the host country legal system and the 
rights it provides, as well as likely requiring perseverance in the 
face of possibly multiple attempts by a host country to impose 
such restrictions; Greenpeace has so far obtained six court judg-
ments in its favor in India.279 
Another option is to try to enlist other countries to bring dip-
lomatic pressure on the host country to reverse or weaken the 
restrictions at issue. For example, when Hungary passed legis-
lation in 2017 that appeared designed to shut down Central Eu-
ropean University because of its funding and other connections 
to George Soros, several top U.S. officials pressured the govern-
ment to allow the university to continue to operate in its current 
form.280 The pressure appears to have the desired effect, as Hun-
gary’s Minister for State Education then suggested that there 
might be a legal loophole that could lead to this result.281 But 
diplomatic pressure is of course not always so successful; for ex-
ample, both Compassion International in India and Mercy Corps 
in Turkey were able to gather some diplomatic support from the 
United States in the face of cross-border funding restrictions, but 
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at this point it appears both NGOs have still been forced to aban-
don their operations in these countries.282 And, of course, other 
countries may sometimes send messages that suggest such re-
strictions are acceptable, even inadvertently, as may have hap-
pened when President Donald Trump’s praise of Egyptian Pres-
ident Abdel Fattah el-Sisi appeared to undermine previous 
criticism from other U.S. officials’ of a law pending before Presi-
dent el-Sisi that imposes severe new restrictions on NGOs and 
so may have encouraged him to sign that law.283 
If lobbying, domestic legal challenges, and diplomacy are ei-
ther not viable options or prove unsuccessful, it may be possible 
for funders and recipients to develop workarounds that success-
fully avoid the restrictions.284 As already noted, it appears that 
such a workaround may exist for the Central European Univer-
sity in Hungary (as helpfully pointed out by a Hungarian minis-
ter in the face of diplomatic pressure).285 Before enactment of the 
most recent set of laws relating to NGOs, a variety of such work-
arounds were available in China, including registering as a for-
eign enterprise, opening a domestic project office, or identifying 
a domestic NGO to receive program funding from a foreign NGO 
as opposed to the foreign NGO itself operating in the country.286 
But as the situation in China demonstrates, such workarounds 
are vulnerable to changes in domestic law.287 
A longer-term solution is to develop the capacity of host 
country NGOs to attract domestic support so that if and when 
restrictions on cross-border funding arise the previously sup-
ported host country NGOs can leave such funding (and the re-
strictions that come with it) behind without unduly compromis-
ing their ability to pursue their missions.288 Such an approach 
may also have the benefit of increasing the connections between 
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such NGOs and their country’s populations, thereby improving 
legitimacy and relevance.289 
The piecemeal nature of these approaches is a major draw-
back to them, but unless invoking investment treaty protections 
is more promising than appears to be the case or until a more 
comprehensive, international effort to secure binding and effec-
tive protections for such funding is feasible, these approaches are 
the only viable way to counter the increasing restrictions on 
cross-border funding of NGOs. Gathering information about 
such approaches and refining them may in fact be a useful role 
for leading cross-border funders to work collaboratively. If such 
efforts prove to be sufficiently successful, then the issues identi-
fied in this Article have been addressed; if not, collaboration on 
this more manageable task could lay the groundwork for a more 
ambitious effort to address these restrictions. 
  CONCLUSION   
The promise of investment treaties to counter burdensome 
legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs is currently a 
hollow one for most, if not all, providers and recipients of such 
funding, because of the significant hurdles to successfully invok-
ing those treaties and the prohibitively high financial costs and 
possible other high costs of doing so. That promise may be sal-
vageable if the arbitration facilities, arbitrators, lawyers, and ex-
perts whose fees drive those high costs could be convinced to do-
nate their services when the claimant is an NGO challenging 
such restrictions or if third-party financing sources could be 
identified for such claims. Absent such efforts and subsequent 
success in invoking these protections, however, the prospects for 
developing new international agreements to create a viable legal 
mechanism for challenging such restrictions are not currently 
very bright, given the lack of a consensus among cross-border 
funders for doing so, the lack of host country recognition of the 
importance of such funding for development and other issues of 
national importance, the limited track record for other ap-
proaches for dealing with such restrictions, and the uncertainty 
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regarding the best model for such agreements. At a minimum, 
and if the history of investment treaties is any guide, it will take 
many years to change these facts so that such new agreements 
have a realistic possibility of being accepted by both home coun-
tries and host countries. In the meantime, less ambitious strat-
egies such as pursuing domestic law remedies and other means 
of relaxing or avoiding these new restrictions likely hold more 
promise for NGOs directly affected by these new restrictions 
than pursuing the uncertain hope that investment treaties can 
protect such funding. 
